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INTRODUCTION 
As China‘s industrialization has entered full swing, transboundary 
pollution has swept eastward across the Manchurian Plain and the Yellow 
Sea into neighboring Northeast Asian countries. The desertification of 
Mongolia and Northwestern China due to global warming has fueled 
seasonal yellow dust storms descending on Korea in increased frequency 
and intensity in recent years,
1
 acting as a vector for various kinds of air 
pollution. On top of sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide that cause acid 
deposition which, in turn, destroys crops and forests, southeasterly winds 
carry fine particulate matter, aerosols, ozone, and heavy metals with more 
significant negative consequences on the health of humans and other 
species.
2
 Soaring demand for energy in China (supplied mainly by coal-
fired power plants) is casting deep uncertainty on regional air quality for 
the future, given the historically unprecedented scale and pace of 
deployment of plants in such a densely populated region.
3
 It is widely 
assumed that coal will be China‘s principal source of energy for many 
decades to come, comprising as much as 70% of energy demand.
4
 
According to the IEA World Energy Outlook for 2011, China will account 
for more than half of the global share of coal use in 2020 with 
conservative assumptions.
5
 However, as China rapidly becomes a major 
world market for internal combustion vehicles, increasing carbon 
monoxide emissions from vehicles are expected to contribute heavily to 
 
 
 1. The Korea Meterological Association records show that from 1960 to 2010, the average 
yearly number of yellow dust incidents has increased from 2.4 per year from 1960–1970 to 11.7 per 
year from 2000–2010. Asian Dust Events in Korea for Recent 100 Years, KMA, http://web.kma.go.kr/ 
eng/weather/asiandust/intro (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). Numerous bilateral initiatives at many 
government levels and non-profits have engaged in forestation projects in China and Mongolia to stem 
the desertification. Cf. Korea to Lead Fight Against Desertification, THE KOREA HERALD, Aug. 9, 
2011; Whasun Jho & Hyunju Lee, The Structure and Political Dynamics of Regulation “Yellow Sand” 
in Northeast Asia, 33(2) ASIAN PERSPECTIVES 41, 57 (2009). Zhang et al., Sources of Asian Dust and 
Role of Climate Change versus Desertification in Asian Dust Emission, 30 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 
LETTERS 2272 (2003). 
 2. Hee-Jin In & Soon-Ung Park, Parameterization of Dust Emission for the Simulation of the 
Yellow Dust Sand, 108 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 22 (2003). 
 3. Jiming Hao, Litao Wang, Shen Minjia, Lin Li & Jingnan Hu, Air Quality Impacts of Power 
Plant Emissions in Beijing, 147 ENVTL. POLLUTION 401–08 (2007). 
 4. Jennifer L. Turner & Linden Ellis, China‟s Growing Ecological Footprint, CHINA MONITOR 
7 (Mar. 2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/china_monitor_article.pdf. 
 5. 2011 Factsheet, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK (2011), 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/factsheets/. This prediction is predicated on successful 
implementation of ambitious energy efficiency targets under the twelfth Five Year Plan. Sheehan, 
Peter, The New Global Growth Plan: Implications for Climate Change Policy and Analysis, 91 
CLIMATE CHANGE 211 (2008). 
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transboundary pollution in Asia and overtake power plants as the primary 
source of air pollution.
6
 
Although Japan, South Korea, and China contribute to the air pollution 
problems of each other to some degree, South Korea is the most 
vulnerable to transboundary pollution from China. One expert estimated 
that 49% of the air pollution in South Korea can be attributed to China.
7
 
Some reports estimate that as much as 50% of acid rain in South Korea 
can be attributed to transboundary pollution from China.
8
 South Korea has 
recently attained significant unilateral improvements in air quality.
9
 These 
achievements are threatened by China‘s continuing and rapid expansion of 
coal-fired electricity capacity
10
 and its expected increased consumption of 
vehicles with internal combustion engines.  
South Korea has neither strongly advocated interstate agreements nor 
resorted to international dispute resolution to prevent the transboundary 
atmospheric pollution confronting its population. Even though progress 
has been steadily made in the diplomatic sphere manifesting a clear intent 
to cope with the problem,
11
 South Korea has carefully refrained from 
characterizing air pollution from China as a ―dispute‖ or a ―problem‖ as 
such. Rather, South Korea has approached the issue foremost as an 
occasion for inter-ministerial and scientific cooperation. As described 
below, South Korea provides funding and technical assistance to various 
regional and sub-regional organizations dedicated to measuring and 
mitigating transboundary air pollution. 
 
 
 6. JULI S. KIM, TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION—WILL CHINA CHOKE ON ITS SUCCESS? 
(2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/transboundary_feb2.pdf. 
 7. Esook Yoon, Cooperation for Transboundary Pollution in Northeast Asia: Non-binding 
Agreements and Regional Countries‟ Policy Interests, 22 PAC. FOCUS 77, 96 (2007). 
 8. Turner & Ellis, supra note 4, at 8. Measuring only the deposition effects of the transboundary 
air pollution, a study by South Korea‘s National Institute of Environmental Research in 2002 found 
that during the summer China accounted for 22% of the total sulfur deposition in South Korea; this 
figure rose to 35% during the winter. Chan-Woo Kim, Northeast Asian Environmental Cooperation: 
From a TEMM‟s Perspective, 12 KOREA REV. INT‘L STUD.19, 21 n.3 (2009). 
 9. Seoul‟s Air Quality Reaches OECD Level, CITY OF SEOUL (Oct. 6, 2009), http://english.seoul 
.go.kr/gtk/news/news_view.php?idx=6960 (reporting particulate matter content from survey from 
January to October 2009). 
 10. Under the eleventh Five Year Plan, China planned a 10% reduction in sulfur dioxide mainly 
from power plants, with an additional 8% in the twelfth Five Year Plan, but it is unclear that these 
targets are being met. Jing Cao, Richard Garbaccio & Mun. S. Ho, China‟s 11th Five-Year Plan and 
the Environment: Reduction SO2 Emissions, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, STATE 
COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1–20, annex 4 (2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/ 
zwgk/2011-09/07/content_1941731.htm 
 11. Esook Yoon describes how South Korea, while exercising strong regional environmental 
diplomacy in the gap left by Japan and China, invariably falls short of advocating binding 
mechanisms. Esook Yoon, South Korean Foreign Environmental Policy, 13 ASIA-PAC. REV. 74 
(2006). 
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South Korea‘s reluctance to use legal solutions for transboundary air 
pollution in this respect is entirely in concert diplomatically with its 
Northeast Asian neighbors, who have consistently eschewed binding 
agreements on matters of transborder environmental harm.
12
 South Korea 
does participate with Japan and China in universal multilateral 
environmental framework conventions concerning dust storms arising 
from desertification
13
 and long-range air pollution,
14
 though it does so 
without committing to protocols with binding emissions limits. However, 
South Korea has concluded no bilateral or regional treaties with any of its 
immediate neighbors on the subject of transboundary air pollution. 
Regional or bilateral agreements acknowledging State duties to prevent 
transboundary harm on the environment are unknown to Northeast Asia.
15
 
In contrast to the multilateral regulatory approach of the European states 
embodied in the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(―LRTAP Convention‖)16 and the bilateral commitments in the U.S.-
Canada Air Quality Agreement,
17
 the Northeast Asian pattern of 
environmental cooperation exemplifies a trend against legalization.
18
 This 
non-legal, non-confrontational approach has not been called into question 
 
 
 12. See infra Part III.C.  
 13. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification obliges countries to provide 
technical and financial assistance to developing countries affected by desertification. United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994, 1958 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 14. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 
[hereinafter LRTAP Convention], available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full% 
20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdf. 
 15. One scholar observes: 
[W]hile the agreements entail reciprocal promises or actions for implementation on the part of 
the individual parties, none of them contains formal clauses that describe the parties‘ 
commitments as binding obligations or legal sanctions for non-compliance. Consequently, the 
interpretation and implementation of the agreements are largely up to the governments of the 
member countries and their practices are not subject to formal scrutiny under the agreements. 
Yoon, supra note 7, at 79. 
 South Korea is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (―ASEAN‖) Cooperation 
Plan on Transboundary Pollution adopted by the ASEAN Ministers for the Environment in October 
1994. ASEAN COOPERATION PLAN ON TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION (Oct. 21, 1994), http://www 
.aseansec.org/8938.htm. The ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution sets out three 
program areas of transboundary pollution on which to carry out cooperative activities: atmospheric 
pollution, the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, and transboundary ship pollution. It also 
includes a series of cooperative actions and strategies. Id. 
 16. LRTAP Convention, supra note 14. 
 17. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676 [hereinafter Agreement on Air 
Quality]. 
 18. Yoon, supra note 7, at 81. ―Low legalization is a defining characteristic of East Asian 
regionalism.‖ Id. at 93 n.35.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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locally in Northeast Asia by the NGO and regional scientific community, 
which has yet to play an assertive role in demanding transnational legal 
standards.
19
 
Unfortunately, the current collective policy response does not match 
the magnitude of the health and environmental problems confronting the 
region arising from China‘s current energy consumption path.20 While 
multilateral development aid from the Asian Development Bank (―ADB‖) 
and other institutions have increased awareness in China and resulted in 
the installation of flue gas desulfurization technology in most new power 
plants,
21
 this technology does not affect emissions of heavy metals and 
other fine particulates from the plants. Further, these measures do not 
address impending accelerating mobile source issues at all. While China 
has made enormous progress in the legislation of environmental 
regulation, it currently lacks dependable enforcement that will prevent 
harm to its neighbors.  
The purpose of this article is to review a variety of external legal 
approaches to transboundary air pollution and to assess the current state of 
environmental dispute resolution mechanisms and common environmental 
norms in Northeast Asia in order to stimulate legal solutions to the 
transboundary air pollution over South Korea. We believe an effective 
legal solution will ultimately entail the creation of an environmental 
governance institution for transboundary air pollution or the functional 
enhancement of a current institution with delegated authority to implement 
or further establish precisely defined rules on permissible levels of 
pollution, as demonstrated by the precedents discussed below.
22
 
 
 
 19.  REMAPPING EAST ASIA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A REGION 233 (T.J. Pempell ed., Cornell 
Univ. Press 2005) (noting that due to pressure from NGO groups, certain companies are adopting 
voluntary company-wide environmental standards at the international level).  
 20. CHARLOTTE KENDRA CASTILLO ET AL., PERRIN QUARLES ASSOCIATES, THE CO-BENEFITS 
OF RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: STATUS IN ASIA 2–10 (2007). 
 21. NORTH-EAST ASIA SUBREGIONAL PROGRAMME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
(NEASPEC), SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION IN NORTH EAST 
ASIA 17–19 (Tokyo, Japan, Dec. 2008), http://www.neaspec.org/documents/som14/SOM14_ADB%20 
RETA%20Project_annex%20I%20Int%27%20Conference%20on%20Transboundary%20Tokyo.pdf. 
 22. We do not contend an interstate agreement by itself will guarantee an effective limitation on 
emissions: 
IEAs [International Environmental Agreements] have little if any persuasive power of their 
own. Their ability to influence behavior depends on supportive governments, corporations, 
NGOs, and individuals taking steps necessary to ‗breathe life into‘ IEC provisions by 
monitoring the behavior of relevant actors, responding to those behaviours in ways that foster 
behavioural change, shedding light on the environmental and economic consequences of 
particular behaviours, and engaging various actors in normative dialogue. 
Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 893, 920 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
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As the historic doctrinal font of the modern international law of 
transboundary environmental harm, the seminal 1941 Trail Smelter 
arbitration
23
 (―Trail Smelter case‖) between the United States and Canada 
is the natural starting point for discussing relevant international law norms 
as well as the evolution of transnational environmental dispute resolution 
methods outside of Asia. The Trail Smelter case occurred at a transition 
point in international environmental law,
24
 representing the prototypical 
example of interstate dispute settlement using an international arbitral 
tribunal and a classical ex-post procedure that allocates liability for 
transboundary harm based on State responsibility.
25
 
In the 1930s, at the request of farmers in the U.S. state of Washington 
who asserted that the fumes from a copper mine in Trail, British 
Columbia, Canada had damaged their crops and forests, the U.S. 
government ―espoused‖ the claims of its citizens against Canada in an 
arbitration administered by the International Joint Commission (―IJC‖). 
The IJC was established under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
26
 
between the United States and Great Britain, concerning Canada. 
Although it is obvious that a procedural solution like the Trail Smelter 
arbitration could never be applied for long-range transboundary air 
pollution of the sort at issue in South Korea, many features of this 
quintessentially legal solution to transboundary pollution are informative 
for addressing transboundary air pollution over South Korea. The two 
countries understood the urgent necessity of intergovernmental action and 
applied rules that resulted in an equitable long-term preventive regime 
(however ineffective). The faulty Trail Smelter arbitration has inspired 
diverse legal-institutional approaches to transboundary environmental 
harm, helping international environmental law overcome initial difficulties 
stemming from the lack of a centralized enforcement authority. Above all, 
recognition by the Northeast Asian States of its central normative 
 
 
 23. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 33 AM. J. OF INT‘L L. 182 (1939) [hereinafter Trail 
Smelter I]; Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 35 AM. J. OF INT‘L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter 
Trail Smelter II]. 
 24. There has been an historical shift of international environmental law from classical dispute 
resolution under international law principles of territorial sovereignty and reciprocity to multi-state 
regulation driven by conservation and prevention ethics. See Peter H. Sand, The Evolution of 
International Environmental Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, supra note 22, at 29. 
 25. Although the liability scheme adopted was an international tort, the case did not actually have 
binding status under international law under the dispute resolution provisions chosen. See infra Part 
II.A.1. 
 26. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to the Boundary Waters and 
Questions Arising Along the Boundary between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 
1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]. 
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conclusion that all States have a duty to prevent transboundary 
environmental harm is essential to securing a solution to the problem of 
the transboundary air pollution in the region. 
In Part I, this article reviews South Korea‘s present international 
cooperation policies concerning transboundary air pollutants over its 
territory and discusses some reasons for the reluctance of the region to 
adopt binding legal solutions. Because of the priority allocated to strategic 
considerations in trade, energy security, and industrial policy, Northeast 
Asian countries have almost uniformly opted for policy autonomy in 
environmental matters. A legacy of historical distrust, multiple competing 
regional environmental institutions, and wide gaps in economic 
development have further hindered regional commitments to reduce 
transboundary air pollution.  
In Part II, we review some legal approaches to cope with transnational 
air pollution that are potentially applicable to Northeast Asia. After 
describing the Trail Smelter case in detail, the article turns to the bilateral 
acid-rain dispute that emerged in the 1970s between Canada and the 
United States. The interplay is a positive example of how the two 
countries ultimately transformed contentious political dialogue into 
bilateral interstate regulation of overall air quality—in this case, through 
the U.S.-Canada Air Quality Agreement.
27
 The pivotal institutional role of 
the IJC in the process is particularly instructive here. The IJC spurred 
action toward legal solutions while exercising multiple bilateral policy 
functions that have augmented its original purpose as an arbitral panel for 
inter-state dispute resolution.
28
 In the LRTAP Convention, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe created a different model for 
controlling transboundary air pollution,
29
 the essence of which is 
multilateral preventative regulation and integrated policy-making based on 
sophisticated scientific assessments and economic modeling.
30
 The 
LRTAP is a cooperative framework treaty to which a series of binding 
commitments for different types of pollutants were attached in later 
protocols.
31
 LRTAP mainly utilizes non-adversarial, non-binding, ―non-
compliance‖ procedures for dispute resolution, which administer 
 
 
 27. Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 17. 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
 29. See generally LRTAP Convention, supra note 14.  
 30. See infra Part II.D. 
 31. See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, HANDBOOK FOR THE 1979 
CONVENTION ON LONG RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION AND ITS PROTOCOLS 2004. 
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regulations that are devised internally by treaty institutions (or by the 
States as members of treaty institutions).
32
 
Next, we discuss the example of transborder environmental litigation 
initiated by private parties or by States occurring outside of Asia. As part 
of a general trend of transnationalization of environmental law, aggrieved 
parties have increasingly brought claims in national courts for 
environmental damage that originated in another country. Most 
commonly, these are private claims facilitated by a treaty for reciprocal 
judicial access or a relevant international civil liability convention.
33
 We 
focus on one particularly controversial incident where private parties 
brought a transboundary environmental claim against a foreign entity 
using domestic environmental regulation. Thus, from the viewpoint of 
international affairs, it can also be considered an example of unilateral 
regulatory enforcement by one state against a non-resident national of 
another State.
34
 Nearly fifty years after Canada was required to pay 
compensation for damage caused by the Trail Smelter, the same facility 
was implicated in alleged releases of heavy metals into the Columbia 
River that flowed downstream and settled into Lake Roosevelt in the U.S. 
state of Washington.
35
 On the opposite side of the spectrum of Asia‘s non-
confrontational, internationalist approach, the United States acted 
unilaterally through its environmental regulator and judicial system 
without bothering with diplomacy or international law questions of 
comity.
36
 A ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
37
 
garnered international criticism for finding liability for the Canadian 
company and ordering it to remediate.
38
 However, we believe the U.S. 
court acted properly and consistently with international law for the reasons 
discussed below. Since, in many cases, either private claims are barred by 
differences in legal systems or intergovernmental bodies are unable to 
 
 
 32. LRTAP, art. 13 (settlement of disputes provision).  
 33. For other relatively recent examples of such cases, see Peter Sand, The Evoluton of 
Transnational Environmental Law: Four Cases in Historical Perspective, 1 TRANSNAT‘L ENVTL. L. 
183 (2012); see also Malgosia Fitzmaurice, International Responsibility and Liability, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 22, at 1010. 
 34. Austin Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, 
and the Search for Solutions to Canada-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U.L. 
REV. 2, 385–98 (2005). 
 35. Id. at 369–79. 
 36. Prescriptive comity, within the context of international law, is the presumption that 
legislators take into account the legislative interests of other nation. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (defining ―prescriptive comity‖ as ―the respect sovereign nations afford 
each other by limiting the reach of their laws‖).  
 37. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 38. Parrish, supra note 34. 
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reach agreement for effective remediation or prevention, unilateral 
measures should not be disavowed completely for significant levels of 
environmental harm. 
In Part III, we contrast the approaches above with the legal 
infrastructure for environmental dispute resolution in Northeast Asia. The 
Northeast Asia preference for non-interference and policy sovereignty 
manifested in regional foreign affairs is domestically reflected in the 
insulation of national legal structures from each other; this is even more 
apparent in matters of environmental law.
39
 This further affirms the 
suitability of interstate preventative regulation rather than ex-post dispute 
resolution for the air pollution problem. The article reviews the current 
State practice of the three countries with respect to environmental treaty-
making and associated interstate environmental dispute resolution 
mechanisms. We will discuss a recent trend, particularly strong in Asia, of 
attempting to incorporate environmental protection, in particular climate-
change mitigation, into industrial policy. In Korea, this is called the 
―Green Growth‖40 economic paradigm. South Korea has led a parallel 
campaign externally to establish Green Growth as an international norm,
41
 
Green growth is potentially complimentary to legal solutions, such as a 
regional transboundary air pollution treaty, through its emphasis on clean 
energy investment, resource conservation and mitigation of climate 
change.  
 
 
 39. Inkyoung Kim, Environmental Cooperation of Northeast Asia: Transboundary Air Pollution, 
7 INT‘L RELATIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 3, 439–54 (2007). 
 40. Green growth is defined under South Korea‘s Low Carbon Green Growth Act as ―growth 
achieved by saving and using energy and resources efficiently to reduce climate change and damage to 
the environment, securing new growth engines through research and development of green technology, 
creating new job opportunities, and achieving harmony between the economy and environment . . . .‖ 
Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, Act. No. 9931, Jan. 13, 20120, ch. 1, art. 2 (S. Kor.), 
available at http://www.greengrowth.org/download/Framework%20Act%20on%20Low%20Carbon 
%20Green%20Growth%202010.pdf. 
 41. In July 2009, an OECD Ministerial chaired by former South Korean Prime Minister Han 
Seung Soo mandated the OECD to develop a comprehensive green growth strategy for its members. 
Since then the OECD has maintained a research project on Green Growth. See ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DECLARATION ON GREEN GROWTH (June 25, 2009), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/34/44077822.pdf. In more universal fora, many 
developing countries have resisted the displacement of the concept of sustainable development with 
that of the Green Economy or Green Growth. See, e.g., Summary of the Second Session of the 
Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development: 7–8 March 2011, EARTH 
NEGOTIATIONS BULL., INT‘L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.iisd.ca/ 
download/pdf/enb2703e.pdf. On the Korean diplomatic drive for green growth generally, See Jill 
Kosch O‘Donnell, ROK Green Growth: Looking Back on Three Years, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (July–Sept. 2011), http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/rok-green-growth-quarterly-update/p26 
445. 
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In the final part, we suggest some international environmental law 
principles and regionally accepted concepts that could underpin a regional 
environmental governance mechanism for regional air quality control.  
I. SOUTH KOREA‘S POLICIES ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 
A. Regional Scientific Cooperation and Technical Assistance for 
Mitigating Transboundary Air Pollution 
South Korea‘s transboundary air pollution policy towards the rest of 
Asia has long made international scientific cooperation the top priority, 
with more recent efforts emphasizing both transferring technical advice on 
regulatory compliance and capacity building for environmental 
regulators.
42
 The most significant permanent inter-governmental body 
coping with transboundary air pollution has been the Northeast Asian 
Subregional Program for Environmental Cooperation (―NEASPEC‖), 
under the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (launched in 1993).
43
 NEASPEC, a general environmental 
forum, is governed by the Senior Officials Meetings of the six countries
44
 
involved, which convene annually.
45
 The participating governments fund 
NEASPEC‘s projects with assistance from the ADB, the World Bank and 
other governments.
46
 The UNESCAP Subregional Office for East and 
Northeast Asia (located in Incheon, Republic of Korea) provides the 
services of a secretariat.
47
 Among NEASPEC‘s most important related 
projects has been a project on Mitigation on Transboundary Air Pollution 
from Coal-fired Power Plants in Northeast Asia, implemented jointly with 
the ADB during 1996 to 2011.
48
 This project has introduced technical 
assistance to China on installation and management of SO2 control 
technologies and assisted Mongolia in drafting new emission regulations.
49
 
Some other examples of multilateral cooperation on air pollution related 
issues include the Acid Deposition and Monitoring Network in East Asia 
 
 
 42. Yoon, supra note 7. 
 43. See Cooperation Mechanisms for Nature Conservation in Transboundary Areas, NEASPEC 
(2011), http://www.neaspec.org/nature.asp [hereinafter NEASPEC]. 
 44. The six countries are South Korea, Russia, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, 
Monglia, the People‘s Republic of China and Japan. Kim, supra note 6, at 27. 
 45. See NEASPEC, supra note 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Mitigation of Air Pollution from Coal-fired Power Plants in North-East Asia, NEASPEC 
(2011), http://www.neaspec.org/mitigation.asp. 
 49. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
576 WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:565 
 
 
 
 
(―EANET‖), and the project for Joint Research on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution in Northeast Asia (―LTP‖).50 
There are good reasons for South Korea to have stressed scientific 
cooperation, monitoring and capacity building at the outset. Monitoring 
activities can bring about agreement on scientific causation.
51
 Decades of 
experience with multilateral environmental treaties has shown that 
investigation and monitoring can be important tools underlying a dynamic 
regulatory framework that can adapt to changes in levels of risk identified 
by science.
52
 In so far as this is the policy direction, the cooperative 
scientific approach is entirely appropriate. However, as argued below, 
active prevention through regional commitments, not just monitoring, is 
necessary to spur parties to fulfill their obligations under international 
environmental law to prevent transboundary harm.  
Like its neighbors, South Korea treats transnational environmental 
issues at the highest diplomatic and political levels, where it can manage 
sensitive political issues outside of the public eye and ensure that regional 
environmental decisions comport with other domestic priorities. At the 
center of cooperative environmental efforts of the three main countries in 
Northeast Asia is the annual Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting 
(―TEMM‖) established in 1999.53 In June 2009, the TEMM in Beijing 
announced its cooperation priority areas for 2009 to 2014.
54
 It identified 
dust and sandstorms (―DSS‖) from Mongolia and China as the most 
pressing regional issue, followed by pollution control (air, water and 
marine environment).
55
 As the country most impacted by DSS (yellow 
dust storms), South Korea has consistently exercised leadership over the 
DSS-related issues in this forum.
56
 DSS is of particular concern in South 
Korea because, inter alia, the yellow dust storms from China carry with 
 
 
 50. See Jeong-Soo Kim, Nat‘l Inst. of Envtl. Res., Joint Research Project on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia: Progress and Outcomes, http://www.neaspec.org/ 
documents/airpollution/PDF/S3_18am_JeongSoo_Kim(NIER)_LTP.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 51. In the Trail Smelter case, the IJC affirmed the roles of monitoring and scientific investigation 
as an indispensible part of the legal solution to transboundary air pollution for the calculation of 
damages and the institution of a regulatory framework to curb future emissions. Trail Smelter II, supra 
note 23, pt. 4, sec. 3. 
 52. See generally Hakan Pleijel, Transboundary Air Pollution: Scientific Understanding and 
Environmental Policy in Europe (2007).  
 53. Chan-Woo Kim, supra note 8. 
 54. Id. at 20. 
 55. Id. 
 56. TEMM, FOOTPRINTS OF TEMM: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION AMONG KOREA, CHINA, AND JAPAN FROM 1999 TO 2010 TRIPARTITE ENVIRONMENT 
MINISTERS MEETING AMONG KOREA, CHINA, AND JAPAN 30 (2011), http://www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/ 
temm/archive/pdf/footprints_E12.pdf. 
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them heavy metals and other persistent organic pollutants (―POPs‖) from 
industrial activities as well as fine particulates that exacerbate local 
pollution and endanger human health.
57
 As the top global priority, the 
countries identified climate change (including co-benefits approaches and 
the Low Carbon Society and Green Growth).
58
 Environmental governance 
in Northeast Asia was found to be the top cross-sectoral priority.
59
 
B. Reasons for South Korea‟s Non-Legal Response 
Why has South Korea not more assertively attempted legal solutions to 
the problem of transboundary air pollution with China? The reasons lie in 
a mix of economic, historical and institutional factors. A few excellent 
studies have explored the non-binding nature of environmental 
cooperation in Northeast Asia from the point of view of the interests of 
each of the actors: China, South Korea and Japan.
60
 Although these studies 
acknowledge cultural factors may exist, in the main the authors agree that 
current diplomatic practices are probably more due to conscious policy 
choices by the key players rather than Asian culture.
61
 The inference that 
―there may be an ‗Asian‘ way of decision-making which is based on the 
principles of non-interference, consultation, and unanimous consensus 
without legalization‖62 contravenes the reality that Northeast Asian 
countries have readily entered into binding legal agreements with each 
other containing adversarial dispute resolution for purposes other than 
environmental protection.
63
  
 
 
 57. TEMM, Abstract of the Special Committee on Sandstorm and Dust Issues, http://www.env 
.go.jp/en/earth/dss/051014.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
 58. Chan-Woo Kim, supra note 8. 
 59. Id. at 31. 
 60. Yoon, supra note 7; see also Inkyoung Kim, supra note 39. 
 61. See Yoon, supra note 7; see also Reinhard Drifte, Transboundary Pollution as an Issue in 
Northeast Asian Regional Politics (Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 12, 2003). For a different 
point of view, see Sangbum Shin, Domestic Environmental Governance and Regional Environmental 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia 3 (Apr. 28, 2009) (unpublished paper, Seoul Workshop of the Nautilus 
Insitute) (on file with Nautilus Institute) (―[T]he three countries share similar and relatively top-down 
patterns of domestic environmental governance structure, which makes it relatively difficult to build 
up effective regional environmental cooperation mechanisms.‖). Shin also cites the relative weakness 
of environmental NGOs in China and Japan. Id. 
 62. Yoon, supra note 7, at 93. 
 63. See infra Part II.C. 
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1. Economic Relations with China 
Economic relations with China have raised swiftly to the top of South 
Korea‘s foreign policy agenda in the last few decades.64 China is South 
Korea‘s largest trading partner and likely will continue to be so for the 
foreseeable future.
65
 The level of foreign direct investment in China by 
South Korean companies is remarkable considering the worldwide 
competition for access to China‘s markets: in 2008 South Korea invested 
U.S. $3.1 billion, the third largest amount after Japan (U.S. $ 3.7 billion) 
and Singapore (U.S. $ 4.4 billion).
66
 Originally a manufacturing base for 
Korea‘s export-oriented economy, China is now a crucial market for South 
Korea‘s consumer goods, especially electronics.67 Korea has for the last 
decade enjoyed a substantial trade surplus with China.
68
 A Korea China 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreement has been a priority of the Korean 
government and is under negotiation.
69
 
From this perspective, South Korea‘s conciliatory position on 
atmospheric pollution seems to be part of a holistic approach to diplomatic 
relations that prioritizes the trade relationship with China. South Korea 
does not want to endanger the privilege of access to Chinese consumer 
markets nor disadvantage itself with respect to other countries competing 
for investment privileges in China. The fact that cooperation on 
transboundary harm has been undertaken in annual meetings at the 
ministerial level, but has resulted in little more than declarations of 
cooperation on scientific projects without any firm intergovernmental 
commitments lends credence to the theory that regional air pollution 
treaties in Asia have not advanced for fear of ―upsetting the apple cart‖ in 
economic relations.  
 
 
 64. JAE HO CHUNG, BETWEEN ALLY AND PARTNER: KOREA-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE 
UNITED STATES (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007); see also David Shambaugh, China and the Korean 
Peninsula: Playing for the Long-term, 26 WASH. Q. 2, 43–49 (2003). 
 65. Troy Stangarone, Korea China Trade Relations a Decade after China‟s WTO Accession, 
KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE (Dec. 2011), http://blog.keia.org/2011/12/korea-china-trade-relations-a-
,decade-after-chinas-wto-accession/. 
 66. Foreign Direct Investment in China, US CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, http://www.uschina.org/ 
statistics/fdi_cumulative.html (last visited Mar. 2011). 
 67. Stangarone, supra note 65. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Zheng Lifei & Eunkyung Seo, China, South Korea Start Talks on Free-Trade Pact, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-02/china-south-korea-
start-talks-on-free-trade-pact.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/2
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2. Historical Distrust 
In contrast to Europe, where economic and legal integration and 
political cooperation has largely overcome the legacy of World War II, in 
Asia, controversies over World War II and pre-war and war-time conduct 
of Japan still make headlines, exerting significant influence on both 
international relations and domestic politics.
70
 Frequent and heated 
controversies over official histories disrupt Japanese relations with China 
and South Korea.
71
 In addition, for these countries, bilateral affairs with 
the United States dominated foreign relations agendas until relatively 
recently. This system of Cold War era alliances with North Korea as a 
potential catastrophic flash point interferes with environmental and social 
cooperation between Socialist China and its neighbors. Unpredictable 
provocations by North Korea, such as the sinking of the South Korean 
warship, the Cheonan, or the attacks on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, and 
the ballistic missile launch in April, 2012, create distractions and 
sometimes turbulence in relations between China and South Korea, 
hindering progress in dimensions other than security.
72
 
Nevertheless, it would be beneficial to Asians to delink environmental 
protection from other foreign affairs issues in order to handle the problems 
posed by each field separately in an incremental fashion. Allowing health 
and environmental concerns to be swept aside or ignored because of 
sporadic or past conflicts or national pride wastes an opportunity to 
improve the lives of current and future generations. After all, as mentioned 
above, that notwithstanding such friction, treaty-making in trade and 
investment areas has been actively advancing. 
Moreover, there is more reason than ever to be optimistic that delinking 
can work when it comes to air pollution. First, China currently pays an 
 
 
 70. South Korea and China Urge Japan to Show Greater Contrition for War, THE GUARDIAN, 
Aug. 15, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/15/second-world-war-
anniversary-asia (noting the tensions between South Korea, China, and Japan that still pervades on the 
sixty-seventh anniversary of World War Two). For regional Asian issues related to disputed islands 
and islets between China, Japan, and South Korea, see Yuka Hayashi & Mitsuru Obe, Japan Puts 
More Pressure on South Korea, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000 
872396390443864204577620982322860966.html. Hayashi and Obe provide an overview of the 
tensions between South Korea and Japan regarding having the issue of the Dokdo/Takeshima islet 
dispute heard by the International Court of Justice in the Hague, Netherlands, which Japan is 
requesting, but South Korea is refusing. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. China Proposes Emergency Talks on Korean Crisis, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 28, 2010), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40401513/ns/world_news-asia_pacific/t/china-proposes-emergency-
talks-korea-crisis/; Mark McDonald, „Crisis Status‟ in South Korea After North Shells Island, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?pagewanted=all.  
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enormous price domestically as a result of air pollution, estimated by the 
World Bank to be as much as 3.8% of GDP.
73
 In 2007, it was calculated 
that, each year, air pollution causes 400,000 premature deaths in China.
74
 
Air pollution is a primary factor (in addition to smoking) that contributed 
to emphysema and chronic bronchitis becoming the leading cause of death 
in China, with a mortality rate five times greater than in most developed 
nations.
75
 Since China is already in the process of imposing stringent 
internal controls over air pollution,
76
 trilateral commitments for the 
reduction of the most hazardous air pollutants which also carry additional 
incentives for scientific technical aid, legal technical assistance and 
financial aid for China could be a win-win situation. The pragmatism and 
recognition of mutual benefit that is at the core of the opening of the 
socialist market economy may again aid negotiations with respect to 
transboundary air pollution, especially as it could have the happy 
coincident effect of reducing China‘s contribution to global warming. 
3. Bureaucratic Competition and Institutional Barriers 
Until now, bureaucratic turf wars between state agencies in both Japan 
and South Korea may have interfered with the conclusion of a multilateral 
treaty on the environment that would have had significant consequences 
on the energy sector. Power plant regulation, being closely aligned with 
energy and industrial policy, has mainly been the province of the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry in Japan and the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy (formerly Ministry of Commerce and Energy) in South Korea, 
while air pollution is handled by the relatively less powerful 
environmental agencies.
77
 At the same time, the foreign affairs agencies, 
 
 
 73. THE WORLD BANK, THE COST OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF 
PHYSICAL DAMAGES (2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org//FFCJVBTP40. 
 74. Turner & Ellis, supra note 4, at 7; see also Mun S. Ho & Dale Jorgenson, Greening China: 
Market-based Policies for Air-Pollution Control, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 32, available at 
http://harvardmag.com/pdf/2008/09-pdfs/0908-32.pdf (updating the results from a 10-year Harvard-
Tchinghwa Project to evaluate the risks of air pollution in China published by the Harvard China 
Project and estimating 710,000 deaths resulted from Chinese pollution as of 2002).  
 75. GARY HAQ ET AL., AIR POLLUTION IN THE MEGACITIES OF ASIA (APMA) PROJECT, 
BENCHMARKING URBAN AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND PRACTICE IN MAJOR AND MEGA CITIES OF 
ASIA: STAGE 1 19 (2002). 
 76. For an analysis of the progress of China‘s air quality regulations, see Hao Ji Ming et al., Air 
Pollution and its Control in China, 1(2) FRONTIERS OF ENVTL. SCI. & ENG‘G IN CHINA 129 (2007). 
 77. Karen Lee, Renewable Energy Law, in KOREAN BUSINESS LAW: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
AND BEYOND 313–23 (Jasper Kim ed., Carolina Academic Press 2010). On bureaucratic competition 
in South Korea over green hours gas regulations, see also the Jill Kosch O‘Donnell, Three Hurdles for 
the Emissions Trading Scheme, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2012), http://www.cfr.org/south-
korea/three-hurdles-emissions-trading-scheme/p28570. Concerning Japanese power plant regulation, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/2
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which are the lead players in international relations and more powerful 
institutions than the ministries of industry and energy or the environment, 
accord lower priority to this type of treaty making than to bilateral 
investment and free trade agreements; indeed, South Korea has entered 
into bilateral investments treaties with the majority of countries in the 
world.
78
 In China, power plant regulation is ultimately decided by the 
National Development and Reform Commission, which is simultaneously 
responsible for national economic and social development as well as 
international climate change negotiations.
79
 
In South Korea, the bureaucratic conflict has been provisionally settled 
with the passage of the Low Carbon Green Growth Act (―LCGGA‖)80 and 
the creation of the Presidential Commission on Green Growth (―PCGG‖) 
in 2009.
81
 The PCGG has ultimate authority for framing national 
economic strategies based on green growth principles and deciding matters 
of energy security and efficiency and climate change.
82
 With the Minister 
of the Environment, the Minister of Information Economy, the Minister of 
Land Transport and Maritime Affairs and the Minister of Strategy and 
Finance in its membership, the PCGG coordinates the low-carbon policies 
under the separate jurisdictions. According to the LCGGA, however, 
primary authority over power plant emissions now resides exclusively 
with the Ministry of the Environment.
83
 
 
 
see AGENCY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/ 
index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 78. The United Nations Commission for Trade and Development Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Database contains 89 investment treaties entered into by the Republic of Korea. See United Nations 
Conference on Trade & Development, Total Number of Bilateral Investment Treaties concluded, 1 
June 2011, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_korea_republic.pdf. 
 79. The NDRC lists environmental goals as its tenth main function:  
To promote the strategy of sustainable development; to undertake comprehensive 
coordination of energy saving and emission reduction; to organize the formulation and 
coordinate the implementation of plans and policy measures for recycling economy, national 
energy and resource conservation and comprehensive utilization; to participate in the 
formulation of plans for ecological improvement and environmental protection; to coordinate 
the solution of major issues concerning ecological building, energy and resource conservation 
and comprehensive utilization; to coordinate relevant work concerning environment-friendly 
industries and clean production promotion.  
Main Functions of the NDRC, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION (NDRC) 
PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/default.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
 80. Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth (LCGGA), Act No. 9931, Jan. 13, 2012; see 
also discussion supra note 40. 
 81. See PCGG Green Growth Korea, ENERGY KOREA, http://energy.korea.com/archives/18990 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
 82. Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth (LCGGA), art. 
15 (discussing the functions of the PCGG). 
 83. Id.; Presidential Decree No. 22124, Apr. 13, 2010, art. 26 (S. Kor.). 
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Regionally, on the other hand, multiple competing institutions with 
overlapping functions for transboundary air pollution inhibit consensus 
formation for coordinated legal responses to air pollution.
84
 Concerning 
acid rain, South Korea has historically led functions of monitoring acid 
rain through LTP while Japan has historically led on modeling through 
EANET.
85
 
One scholar described the situation as follows:  
 One result is the whole array of parallel institutions for 
environmental cooperation which have been established through 
different channels and sponsors, including environment ministries, 
foreign ministries, environmental institutes, NGOs and the 
epistemic community. This has led to duplication and redundancy 
and sometimes these endeavours seem to serve more the vanity or 
ambition of some national institution or individuals than a more 
effective subregional coordination. The problem of duplication is 
also worsened by the geographic scope of these parallel institutions 
which varies between global, broader-than-regional (i.e. Asia 
Pacific) and subregional.
86
 
Compounding difficulties in political coordination, China, Japan and 
South Korea have failed to agree on a single air pollution model for the 
region; instead, they employ three models simultaneously.
87
 Thus, each of 
the countries can point to scientific ambiguity concerning the measure of 
responsibility or the costs to avoid action.
88
 Employing monitoring and 
models designed to address acid rain, the states of the region have failed to 
adequately account for the transboundary harm from small particulate 
matter (PM10 or below).
89
 Although small particulate matter travels 
greater distances more easily and poses more direct risk to human health, 
the cooperative monitoring capacity for transboundary transmission of 
 
 
 84. Chan-Woo Kim, supra note 8, at 27. 
 85. Inkyoung Kim, supra note 39, at 445. 
 86. Drifte, supra note 61, at 15. 
 87. The three models are Community Multi-scale Air Quality (―CMAQ‖) in China, 
Comprehensive Acid Deposition Model (―CADM‖) in South Korea, and Regional Air Quality Model 
(―RAQM‖) in Japan. SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION IN 
NORTH EAST ASIA, supra note 21, at 3. 
 88. Lack of scientific consensus has been stressed as a factor creating difficulties in regional 
environmental governance. Kim, supra note 39, at 447. Sangmin Nam, Ecological Interdependence 
and Environmental Governance in Northeast Asia: Politics versus Cooperation, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY IN PACIFIC ASIA 168 (Paul G. Harris ed., 
2002). 
 89. Second Period Report on the State of Acid Deposition in East Asia: Part III Executive 
Summary, EANET (2011), http://www.eanet.cc/product/PRSAD/2_PRSAD/2_ex.pdf. 
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small particulate matter and heavy metals lag significantly behind the 
cooperative investigations on sulfur dioxide or nitrates.
90
 Monitoring of 
small particulate matter began in 2008
91
 by NEASPEC in eight locations, 
but not in major urban areas such as Tokyo or Seoul where yellow dust 
episodes severely exacerbate already high levels of ambient atmospheric 
pollution.
92
 
4. The Developmental Gap 
Due to different stages of development, South Korea and Japan, on the 
one hand, and China, on the other, have widely different regulatory 
capacities for environmental protection, impeding the harmonization of 
regulation. In the case of South Korea, South Korea‘s per capita GDP in 
2011 was U.S. $22,424, more than four times that of China‘s per capita 
GDP (U.S. $5,430).
93
 With a great de facto head start on environmental 
regulation due to the chaos in the Chinese legal system during the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, South Korea has considerable 
experience with emissions regulation and much higher demand 
domestically for a clean environment.
94
 In environmental relations, China 
argues that its development priorities outweigh the harms incurred by 
other countries from transboundary-atmospheric pollution, demanding 
more aid for technology to be provided by the other players.
95
 At the same 
time, the scale and scope of aid necessary to bring China, with its 
enormous size and population, into compliance with higher standards may 
 
 
  90. Id. 
 91. LTP‘s investigations of source and receptors currently involves SO2, NOx, NH3, CO, VOC, 
and PM10, but more attention may be paid to ozone precursors and hazardous air pollutants, including 
heavy metals, in the future. For Korean proposals to update the LTP project for the post-2012 phase, 
see The NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, JOINT 
RESEARCH PROJECT ON LONG RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTANTS—PROGRESS OUTCOMES 
AND FUTURE PLAN (2011), available at http://www.neaspec.org/documents/tap_nov_2011/3-2%20 
Joint%20Research%20Project%20on%20Long-Range%20Transboundary%20Air%20Pollutants.pdf. 
 92. One recent study conducted in Seoul on PM2.5 found that secondary sulfate (20.9%) and 
secondary nitrate (20.5%) from regional sources were the greatest contributors to local PM2.5. The 
authors concluded the secondary sulfate was most likely to come from industrial regions in Eastern 
China and that long-range transport of yellow dust from Mongolia and the Gobi Desert influenced the 
high soil impact of PM2.5 in and around Seoul. See J.-B. Heo, P.K. Hopke & S.-M. Yi, Source 
Apportionment of PM2.5 in Seoul, Korea, 9 ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 4957, 4968–69 (2009). 
 93. Data: GDP Per Capita (current US$), THE WORLD BANK (2012), http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
 94. A good summary of the development of South Korea‘s environmental laws can be found in 
Ki Han Lee, South Korean Environmental Policies and Environmental Cooperation Issues in Northeast 
Asia, Presentation at the 21st Conference on the Law of the World (Aug. 17–23, 2003). 
 95. See Inkyoung Kim, supra note 39, at 452, discussing China‘s position on the Montreal 
Protocol. 
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be such that the costs of a bilateral treaty might outweigh its benefits for 
either South Korea or Japan alone. 
II. EXPLORING LEGAL SOLUTIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 
OVER SOUTH KOREA 
A. Why Legalization? 
1. The Nature of Transboundary Air Pollution 
The harm from transboundary air pollution seldom has spectacular 
manifestations on par with an oil spill or a nuclear accident, even though it 
is spread over a large number of people. The most serious victims of 
transboundary air pollution tend to be: (1) the very young, whose life-time 
lung capacity is formed under the influence of ambient air, (2) chronic 
bronchitis and asthma sufferers and (3) the very old, who may die 
prematurely from related bronchitis, emphysema or heart attacks.
96
 At the 
same time, identifying the source of long-range transboundary air 
pollution is impossible for the average victim, thus public action through 
regulation is the only means to ensure that harm stays within acceptable 
levels. When a transboundary public good such as air is at issue, the 
collective action problems are acute.
97
 Whereas in other environmental 
areas where a prominent catastrophe, such as an oil spill or a nuclear 
accident, will serve to excite national legislatures to action, there are no 
threshold events in the field of air pollution.
98
 
At the time of the Trail Smelter case, the citizens of the United States 
were forced to rely on their government for redress because of limitations 
in coordination between the legal systems of the United States and 
Canada. (Today, such a private claim would be allowed, as in many other 
 
 
 96. The important effects of long-term exposure to PM include reduction in lung function in 
children, increase in chronic obstructive cardio-pulminary disease, increase in lower respiratory 
systems, reduction in life expectancy, mainly due to cardiopulmonary mortality but probably also to 
lung cancer. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE HEALTH RISKS OF PARTICULATE MATTER FROM 
LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 11 (2006), available at http://www.euro.who.int/ 
__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/78657/E88189.pdf. 
 97. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 
87 GEO. L.J. 749 (1999); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 
DUKE L.J. 931 (1997). 
 98. Concerns have been raised recently in South Korea that the yellow dust storms will carry 
radioactive elements from the recent Fukushima nuclear disaster. Se Young Lee, Radiation Fear Also 
Rises in Korea, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2011/03/17/radiation 
-fear-also-rises-in-korea/; South Korean Schools Close Amid Radiation Fears, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/08/south-korea-schools-radiation-fear. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/2
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jurisdictions).
99
 The relationship between South Korea and China is 
analogous, though interstate coordination is necessary for different 
reasons. Given the nature of long-range transboundary pollution, the 
citizens must rely on their governments for resolution because of the 
extreme distances involved and the corresponding difficulty of tracing the 
sources of liability for expost resolution.
100
 
Transboundary air pollution is an unpriced negative externality with 
high social costs. With no possibility of defining property rights over the 
air involved, countries will not, by themselves, engage in Coasean 
bargaining to arrive at the socially optimal output of pollution without 
some form of regulation between them.
101
 
Just as within the national context externalities are considered a 
market failure to which the law should react, the same is the case as 
well for transboundary environmental harm. In the absence of legal 
rules which force countries to take into account the transboundary 
pollution they cause, States will have no incentives to do so. The 
primary goal of international environmental law should therefore, 
from this simple economic perspective, be no other than the 
internalization of the transboundary externality caused by 
pollution.
102
 
2. Rules and Principles versus Policies 
The responses to transboundary pollution from outside of Northeast 
Asia show that states often move beyond policy-making and instead utilize 
legal norms-that is, they also use rules and principles to address 
transboundary pollution. Ronald Dworkin first distinguished between 
policies, principles and rules to build a theory of legal obligation for his 
 
 
 99. See Sand, supra note 33. 
 100. LRTAP Convention, supra note 14. According to article 1(b) of the LRTAP treaty,  
―long-range transboundary air pollution‖ means air pollution whose physical origin is situated 
wholly or in part within the area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has 
adverse effects in the area under the jurisdiction of another State at such a distance that it is 
not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups 
of sources. 
Id. 
 101. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 102. Michael Faure & Gerrit Betlem, Applying National Liability Law to Transboundary Air 
Pollution: Some Lessons from Europe and the United States, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 129, 129 (Michael 
Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008). 
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theory of liberal democratic jurisprudence.
103
 Dworkin defines ―policy‖ as 
―that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an 
improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the 
community . . . .‖104 He defines a ―principle‖ as: 
a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or 
secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, 
but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other 
dimension of morality. Thus the standard that automobile accidents 
are to be decreased is a policy, and the standard that no man may 
profit by his own wrong is a principle.
105
 
Building on the work of Dworkin, Ulrich Beyerlin further distinguishes 
between rules and principles in the context of international environmental 
law. He explains that the former ―are norms immediately aimed at making 
the addressees take action, refrain from action, or achieve a fixed result, 
while the latter only aim at influencing the states‘ decision-making, which 
otherwise remains open to choice . . . .‖106 
Northeast Asian countries have strongly preferred policies or non-
binding declarations of principles rather than rules to deal with matters of 
transboundary pollution in order to preserve their policy discretion, as well 
as to avoid taking responsibility for the choices made by private actors. 
But now, China‘s rapid industrialization has raised a stark dilemma for the 
region: how to meet growing energy needs while maintaining air quality in 
the region for coming generations. The urgency of the dilemma demands 
that countries adopt action-oriented rules rather than policies, which would 
only postpone effective solutions to intensifying problems. It is important 
to point out that legal solutions need not be adversarial, or even 
necessarily grounded in a strict right or duty state responsibility paradigm, 
but they do involve a certain binding mutual accountability brought about 
through a compliance or monitoring process. Accountability and 
legitimacy can be reinforced by public participation and delegation. 
 
 
 103. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Ulrich Beyerlin, Policies, Principles and Rules, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 22, at 437. 
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3. Legalizing Institutions: Obligation, Precision and Delegation 
An effective treatment of transboundary air pollution in the Northeast 
regions is likely to involve more than just binding pollution reduction 
commitments in a treaty, the creation of a regional air pollution institution 
for implementation (such as the IJC) or rulemaking, or the functional 
enhancement of an existing institution.
107
 As Yang and Percival noted, 
―the modern trend in environmental treaty making has been to create 
environmental institutions as key tools for achieving treaty objectives. 
Thus, multilateral agreements are not mere ‗contracts‘ between the states, 
but are increasingly crafting regulatory regimes and multi-function 
institutions.‖108 
As discussed above, a variety of Northeast Asian inter-governmental 
environmental fora currently exist or lie dormant in treaties,
109
 but they are 
all strictly diplomatic or scientific in nature. How could an existing 
institution become ―legalized‖? Kenneth Abbot and colleagues have 
presented a theory of legalization of international organizations based on 
three characteristics: obligation, precision and delegation.
110
 They define 
these terms as follows: 
Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or 
commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it 
means that they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the 
sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the 
general rules, procedures and discourse of international law . . . . 
Precision means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they 
require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that third parties 
have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the 
rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.
111
 
Accordingly, in order for a current Northeast Asian environmental 
cooperative forum to become legalized, these three characteristics would 
have to be strengthened. For example, an obligation to set binding air 
 
 
 107. In principle, such environmental governance institutions need not be exclusively part of an 
environmental treaty, but could also be in an annex to an FTA if they include an explicit mandate to 
control regional air pollution. Although no current FTA example of this model of enforcement exists, 
enforcement could be linked to other benefits of the treaty. 
 108. Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 656 (2009). 
 109. See infra Part III.C. 
 110. Kenneth W. Abbot et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT‘L ORG. 401 (2000). 
 111. Id. at 401, 408–10. 
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pollution standards over a precisely defined period and the delegation of 
powers by the States to an entity (staffed by regional air quality experts 
from each of the countries) for implementation or dispute resolution would 
enhance the legalization, as well as the legitimacy, of an existing 
environmental governance mechanism. However, we would add another 
recommendation for effective regional governance for air quality. Many of 
the active current inter-State environmental fora, such as TEMMS, attempt 
to cover many environmental issues simultaneously.
112
 A permanent 
standing institution committed to the air quality issue alone and 
centralizing the related activities of the other institutions may be more 
efficient in its decision making.  
B. The Trails Smelter Case: The Duty to Prevent Transboundary 
Environmental Harm 
The diverse range of legal responses that have been employed by the 
United States and Canada to grapple with transboundary harm offers 
interesting comparisons for South Koreans.
113
 To a remarkable extent, the 
agreed modes of environmental dispute resolution between Canada and the 
United States on air and water issues have been shaped by the example of 
the resolution of a single dispute. Although its procedural example was not 
followed again by the U.S. and Canadian governments nor by any other 
government with regard to regional transboundary harm,
114
 its normative 
conclusions have resonated widely beyond North America. It is often 
acknowledged that modern international environmental law owes its 
origins to this case.
115
 
In the early 1900s, a copper smelter owned by Teck Cominco in Trail, 
British Columbia began emitting fumes near the border of the United 
States.
116
 In the 1920s, the level of such emissions began to increase to 
more than 300 tons of sulfur emitted daily, large quantities of which were 
 
 
 112. See Chan-Woo Kim, supra note 8. Under TEMMS, several related working groups have been 
established in the last five years besides the JRPLT: the Joint Research on Sand and Dust storms, as 
well as Research on Photochemicaloxidents. TEMMS FOOTPRINTS, supra note 56, at 30, 35. 
 113. For a lengthier discussion of the harmonization of national and international law using the 
historical example of United States and Canada, see Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: 
Harmonizing International and Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681 (2007). 
 114. See John Knox, The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong 
Parties and the Wrong Law, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE 
TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russel A. Miller eds., 2006). 
 115. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 45 (2d ed. 
2000). 
 116. Trail Smelter II, supra note 23. 
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of sulfur dioxide.
117
 Contending the fumes were destroying nearby 
orchards and crops, Washington state farmers requested intervention by 
the U.S. government.
118
 After a period of negotiations between the United 
States and Canada, in 1928, Canada agreed to refer the matter to the IJC 
pursuant to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
119
 
The subject matter jurisdiction of the IJC was founded in Article IX of 
the treaty. Article IX and X confer authority on the tribunal to investigate 
matters ―involving the rights, obligations or interests of the United States 
or of the Dominion of Canada either in relation to each other or to their 
respective inhabitants‖ referred to it by either of the two parties.120 
Decisions made under Article IX are not binding, while those under 
Article X are binding.
121
 Both the Trail Smelter decision and the 
subsequent arbitration were referred to the IJC under Article IX.
122
 In 
1931, the Commission concluded that damages in the amount of U.S. 
$350,000 had resulted; Canada agreed to pay the amount.
123
 However, one 
major omission of the decision was that no enjoinment action was issued 
to compel Canada to cease the Smelter‘s sulfur emissions.124 As a result, 
emissions from the lead and zinc plant continued.
125
 In 1938, the United 
States argued for U.S. $2 million in damages for the period from 1931 to 
1938; the Commission awarded damages of U.S. $78,000.
126
 Again, no 
enjoinment was issued by the Commission until 1941, when the United 
States argued for such remedy.
127
 
The issue in the 1941 case was whether Canadian Trail Smelter could 
be refrained from emitting fumes that could cause damage to the U.S. state 
of Washington.
128
 At this point, the IJC noted that no case of air pollution 
existed for an international tribunal, and in order to avoid a non-liquet, the 
tribunal relied upon two sources of U.S. federal law for direction. It looked 
 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 26, arts. I, X.  
 121. Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty, which has never been used, states: ―Any questions 
or matters of difference arising between the High Contracting Parties involving the rights, obligations, 
or interests of the United States or of the Dominion of Canada either in relation to each other or to 
their respective inhabitants, may be referred for decision to the International Joint Commission by 
consent of the Parties . . . .‖ Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 26. 
 122. Trail Smelter I, supra note 23; Trail Smelter II, supra note 23. 
 123. Trail Smelter I, supra note 23. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Trail Smelter II, supra note 23. 
 126. Trail Smelter I, supra note 23. 
 127. Trail Smelter II, supra note 23.  
 128. Id. 
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to U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the common law of nuisance 
between U.S. states and a case of the Swiss Federation, applying them by 
analogy to international disputes.
129
 However, the Commission did refer to 
various international law sources, including Professor Eagleton (an 
international law scholar), who posited that ―[a] state owes at all times a 
duty to protect other states against injurious acts by individuals from 
within its jurisdiction.‖130 The Commission ultimately concluded that ―no 
State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory‖ so as to ―cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.‖131 Thus, the Commission 
deemed that the Dominion of Canada had a duty to act in conformity with 
the principles of international law (as stated by the Commission).
132
 
The ―no harm‖ principle of the Trail Smelter case extended to 
international relations an ancient civil law maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienem 
non laedus (―use your own property so as not to harm that of another‖). 
Not long after the Trail Smelter case, the International Court of Justice 
(―ICJ‖) endorsed this principle in the Corfu Channel case to state that no 
State may use its territory contrary to the rights of others.
133
 In its 
Advisory Opinion of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
134
 and in the 
judgment of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project,
135
 the Court also stated, 
―The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment.‖  
In codifying the law of international responsibility for transboundary 
harm, the International Law Commission affirmed with reference to the 
Trail Smelter arbitration: (1) there exists a duty of States to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or at least minimize its impact; and (2) the 
prevention of harm is an obligation of due diligence.
136
 The most familiar 
 
 
 129. See Trail Smelter I, supra note 23, at pt. 2; Trail Smelter II, supra note 23, at pt. 3. 
 130. CLYDE EAGLETON, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1928). 
 131. See Trail Smelter II, supra note 23, at pt. 3. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 3). 
 134. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 
(July 8). 
 135. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 53 (Sept. 25).  
 136. Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm, 1 U.N.Y.B. INT‘L L. COMM‘N 65, 
pt. 2 (2000). For other implications of the Trail Smelter decision, see Mark Drumbl, Trail Smelter and 
the International Law Commission‟s Work on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
and State Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
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restatement of the Trail Smelter rule is found in Rio Principle 2 in which 
the duty to prevent significant transboundary harm is balanced against the 
right of states to determine their own economic development policies: 
States have, in accordance with The Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.
137
 
C. The International Joint Commission and the U.S.-Canada Air Quality 
Agreement: Accountability Through Delegation 
1. The Agreement on Air Quality 
Canada and the United States have instituted a highly coordinated 
bilateral transboundary pollution regulatory regime through almost a 
century of legal and diplomatic interaction with dialogue and litigation 
involving civil society groups, national and regional governments, and 
private claimants. The foundation of the current bi-national system is the 
Agreement on Air Quality,
138
 which refers to the Trail Smelter and 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration in its preamble.
139
 The treaty and its 
annexes on binding reductions for sulfur and nitrous emissions of the two 
countries were achieved in no small measure through objective scientific 
investigation and progressive formalization of policies formulated by the 
IJC.
140
 
When the harmful effects of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and other 
particulates were first beginning to be understood in the United States and 
Canada after World War II, the power plant industry responded by 
building its stacks at even larger heights.
141
 As a result, by mixing with 
 
 
SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 114. Drumbl discusses Draft Articles 14, 30, 31 and 36 of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Id. 
 137. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June 3–
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 
I), Annex I (Aug. 12 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].  
 138. Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 17. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 555–57 (3d ed. 
2006); WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 505–08 (2d ed. 2006).  
 141. Jes Fenger, Air Pollution in the Last 50 Years: From Local to Global, 43 ATMOSPHERIC 
ENVIRONMENT 15–17 (2009). 
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precipitation and atmospheric winds, pollution became delocalized.
142
 In 
1966, the governments of these countries entrusted the IJC with the 
authority to investigate the acid rain issue. In response to studies by the 
IJC and others that concluded pollution from stacks caused acid deposition 
in the Great Lakes and other surface waters, the United States and Canada 
formed a Bilateral Research Consultation Group on the long range 
transport of airborne pollutants in 1978.
143
 Although both countries were 
already members of Europe‘s LRTAP Convention, in 1980 they signed a 
Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution to work towards 
developing a bilateral agreement on air quality.
144
 Both countries 
appointed special envoys on acid rain.
145
 In 1983, separate peer reviews of 
scientific reports from each country produced by working groups 
established under the Memorandum called for immediate emissions 
reductions and regulatory action.
146
 Canada, whose transboundary flux 
was far less than that of the United States, had taken unilateral action to 
reduce its flux by 50% while continuously requesting the United States to 
do the same.
147
 However, for much of the 1980s, the United States averred 
that more scientific research was necessary, resisting calls from the 
Canadian government and the states of New York and Ontario.
148
 Finally, 
in 1990, the United States amended the Clean Air Act to require utilities to 
reduce emissions of sulfur by ten million tons by the year 2000 through 
employing an emissions trading system to reduce costs; this system was 
quantitatively consistent with Canada‘s demands for a 50% decrease in 
transboundary sulfur dioxide.
149
 Shortly thereafter, negotiations began at 
the head of State level, which eventually led to the Agreement on Air 
Quality Agreement that was concluded in 1991.
150
 
Under Article IV, both countries should establish specific objectives 
for emissions limitations or reductions, undertake environmental impact 
assessment for projects likely to cause significant fluxes with prior 
 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. JURGEN SCHMANDT, JUDITH CLARKSON & HILLARD RODERICK, ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY 
NEIGHBORS 65 (Duke Univ. Press, 1988). 
 144. United States-Canada Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, Interim 
Report (Feb. 1981), available at http://nepis.epa.gov. 
 145. Id. 
 146. CO-CHAIRMEN G.E. BANGAY & C. RIORDAN, IMPACT ASSESSMENT WORK GROUP I (1983), 
available at http://nepis.epa.gov. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 482 U.S. 919 (1987); 
Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 149. Amendments to Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 (1989), available at http:// 
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:S1630. 
 150. Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 17. 
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notification and carry out coordinated cooperative scientific activities.
151
 A 
Joint Air Quality Committee composed of the deputy secretaries of the 
environmental agencies was created to assist the countries in 
implementation by producing a biennial report on air quality that would be 
subject to review and assessment.
152
 The IJC was entrusted with reviewing 
the air quality reports, soliciting public comment and submitting 
recommendations to the Parties based on the public comment.
153
 After 
each five year assessment cycle, the parties ―shall consider such action as 
may be appropriate, including (a) the modification of this Agreement (b) 
the modification of existing policies, program or measures.‖154 
In the event of a dispute, Art. XIII prescribes the methods of resolution: 
(1) If, after consultations in accordance with Article XI, a dispute 
remains between the Parties over the interpretation or the 
implementation of this Agreement, they shall seek to resolve such 
dispute by negotiations between them. Such negotiations shall 
commence as soon as practicable, but in any event not later than 
ninety days from the date of receipt of the request for negotiation, 
unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.  
(2) If a dispute is not resolved through negotiation, the Parties shall 
consider whether to submit that dispute to the International Joint 
Commission in accordance with either Article IX or Article X of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty. If, after such consideration, the Parties do 
not elect either of these options, they shall, at the request of either 
Party, submit the dispute to another agreed form of dispute 
resolution.
155
 
The referral to the IJC would result in a binding agreement with respect to 
the particular dispute without precedential legal effect for any other 
dispute.
156
 
In the Annexes to the agreement, both countries pledged to achieve a 
permanent national cap on sulfur dioxide emissions by 2010 (twenty years 
after the execution of the treaty), and to meet technology-based standards 
for reducing NOx emissions from mobile sources.
157
 Between 1980 and 
 
 
 151. Id. art. IV. 
 152. Id. art. VIII. 
 153. Id. art. IX. 
 154. Id. art. X. 
 155. Id. art. XIII. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. annexes. 
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2001 Canada and the United States had reduced sulfur dioxide emissions 
by 48% and 39% respectively, although many challenges remained due to 
the uncertainty of atmospheric interactions between chemical compounds 
other than sulfur dioxide.
158
 The Air Quality Agreement was followed by 
an Ozone Annex in 2000 in which both countries agreed to aggressively 
reduce nitrogen oxides and Volatile Organic Compounds.
159
 
It would be manifestly unfair to draw strict comparisons between 
Northeast Asia and North America on regional regulation of transborder 
pollution. Compared to Northeast Asia, conditions for regulatory 
integration between the United States and Canada were highly favorable, 
including contiguous borders, the same language, similar cultural heritage 
and common legal traditions. Still, history serves as a helpful model for 
progressive legalization of diplomatic and cooperative scientific efforts. 
Some features of the Air Quality Agreement that serve to make it a 
more effective instrument are: 
(1) Legally binding commitments to reduce emissions; 
(2) Public access to technical records and public review of 
compliance; and 
(3) Permanent transnational institutions dedicated to prevention and 
dispute resolution, such as the IJC overseeing compliance which 
enjoys legitimacy with NGOs and national and regional 
governments.
160
 
2. The Institutional Role of the IJC 
No doubt one of the most important factors in the success of the 
diplomatic process that resulted in the Air Quality Agreement was the IJC 
itself, a non-diplomatic entity with multiple roles in inter-State 
environmental governance and interstate environmental scientific 
cooperation.
161
 The IJC‘s overall reputation for objectivity and 
effectiveness in breaking impasses comes from its bilateral, non-political, 
 
 
 158. NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM REPORT FOR CONGRESS: AN 
INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 17 (2005), available at http://ny.water.usgs.gov/projects/NAPAP/NAPAP 
Report2005.pdf. 
 159. Canada-U,S. Air Quality Agreement, Ozone Annex (2000), available at https://www.ec.gc 
.ca/air/default.asp?lang=En&n=FA26FE79-1. 
 160. Jason Bhuhi & Lin Feng, The International Joint Commission‟s Role in the United States-
Canada Transboundary Air Pollution Control Regime: A Century of Experience to Guide the Future, 
11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 107 (2009). 
 161. Id. 
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non-professional character. The United States and Canada each appoint 
three commissioners who are experts in air and water quality.
162
 Although 
the IJC may take up an issue on the initiative of either country, by custom, 
the States have generally cooperated to formulate and submit the questions 
for investigation.
163
 
a. Scientific Investigation and Policy Recommendations 
In its 100 years of existence, on five different occasions the IJC has 
overseen scientific investigations and economic studies on questions 
referred to it and reported its conclusions on matters concerning 
transboundary air and water.
164
 For this purpose, it normally creates 
provisional bi-national technical bodies staffed with experts and 
government officials at state and regional levels of government from both 
countries.
165
 Although the reports and recommendations of the IJC are not 
binding, they are recognized as authoritative and have often led to further 
regulatory actions by the countries. 
b. Compliance and Public Accountability 
As noted above, the IJC has been delegated powers in the compliance 
procedures of relevant bilateral environmental treaties, while serving as an 
important conduit for public opinion and accountability to the public in the 
compliance process. In addition to the IJC‘s role noted above under the 
Air Quality Agreement, in 1978 the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
conferred upon the IJC the power to conduct public hearings and compel 
testimony on compliance.
166
 This element of these treaties recognizes that 
the nature of the collective action problems inherent in transboundary 
 
 
 162. Boundary Waters Treaty, Art. XII, supra note 26. 
 163. Noah Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the 
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 418 (2006). 
 164. The five instances were as follows: Trail Smelter in Docket 25R (1928); the first Detroit river 
vessel reference to the Windsor and Detroit‘s ship smoke in Docket 61R (1949); the second Detroit-St. 
Clair river region reference to Port Huron-Sarnia and the Detroit Windsor in Docket 85R (1966); the 
third Detroit-St. Clair region reference to Port Huron-Sarnia and the Detroit Windsor in Docket 99R 
(1975); and the Air Quality Agreement in Docket 112R (1991).  Boundary Waters Treaties: Dockets, 
IJC.ORG (2012), http://bwt.ijc.org/index.php?page=dockets&docket-search-region=13&hl=eng&sort 
By=region. 
 165. For the current composition of boards and task forces, see Boards, INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
COMMISSION, http://www.ijc.org/en/boards/boards_conseils.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 166.  Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, available at http://www.ijc.org/en/activities/ 
consultations/glwqa/agreement.php. 
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pollution require a strong and continuous communicative link between the 
public and the government. 
D. The Convention for Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: 
Institutionalization of Prevention
167
 
The UNECE‘s LRTAP Convention consists of a framework treaty for 
forty-nine countries supplemented by binding protocols on individual 
pollutants.
168
 The main substantive obligations of LRTAP found in 
Articles 2 and 3 are: ―Contracting Parties . . . shall endeavor to limit, and 
as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution, including 
long-range transboundary air pollution‖ and ―each Contracting Party 
undertakes to develop the best policies and strategies including air quality 
management systems, and as part of them, control measures compatible 
with balanced development, in particular by using the best available 
technology which is economically feasible and low-and non-waste 
technology.‖169 Specific obligations were clarified through subsequent 
protocols instituting emissions limits on sulfur, nitrogen oxides, volatile 
organic compounds, heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants.
170
 
Subsequent implementations of air pollution targets have included flexible 
 
 
 167. LRTAP Convention, supra note 14. 
 168. The Northeast Asian countries have already adopted the idea of a cooperative program for 
the monitoring and evaluation of long-range air pollutants (EANET), but there are no substantive 
obligations for reduction or maintenance of emissions as in the case of LRTAP. The objectives of 
EANET are 
1. To create a common understanding of the state of acid deposition problems in East Asia;  
2. To provide useful inputs for decision-making at local, national and regional levels aimed 
at preventing or reducing adverse impacts on the environment caused by acid deposition; and  
3. To contribute to cooperation on the issues related to acid deposition among the 
participating countries.  
EANET‘s periodic reports on acid deposition in the region and technical guidelines can be found 
at http://www.eanet.cc/product/index.html. 
 169. LRTAP, supra note 14. 
 170. See generally Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 percent, July 8, 
1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes, 
Nov. 4, 1988, 1593 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary 
Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 2001 U.N.T.S. 187; The Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions, June 14, 1994, 2030 U.N.T.S. 122; 
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals, June 
24, 1998, 2237 U.N.T.S. 4; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants, June 24, 1998, 2230 U.N.T.S. 79; Protocol to the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate Acidifcation, Eutrophication and 
Ground-level Ozone, Nov. 30, 1999, Document of the Economic and Social Council EB.AIR/1999/1. 
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means of compliance to accommodate the diversity of country 
participants, such as grandfathering in the Eastern European countries.
171
 
Unlike in North America, where the United States and Canada 
committed to an average level of emissions over a broad area, the Second 
Sulfur Protocol adopted the ―critical load‖ approach to reduce 
emissions.
172
 The critical load is defined as the amount of exposure to one 
or more pollutants below which significant harmful effects on certain 
sensitive elements of the environment do not occur.
173
 Critical loads were 
defined over 150 km
2
over the continent.
174
 Then using air transport 
models, the parties calculated their emission reductions by reference to the 
critical loads of the areas that their fluxes impacted.
175
 The critical load 
approach is significant because it more realistically reflects true 
environmental impact than flat calculations of percentage contributions. 
In addition, LRTAP‘s standard setting takes into account the ―co-
benefits‖ of conventional air quality standards. Recognizing that reduction 
of conventional air pollution can reduce climate change as well, the 
countries of LRTAP set their emissions limits by opting for both policy 
goals using the integrated approach of the Greenhouse Gas and Air 
Pollution Interactions and Synergies (―GAINS‖) model developed by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
176
 In other words, 
using GAINS to find the right policy mix, the countries can achieve the 
same health benefits while meeting greenhouse gas (―GHG‖) targets and 
saving money in comparison to the old standards-setting approach.
177
 
The North American and European treaties utilize very different 
institutions for implementation. In line with the international trend toward 
making law within treaties rather than without,
178
 the Executive Body of 
 
 
 171.  See Directives 1999/30/EC relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and 
oxides of nitrogen, particulate matter and lead in ambient air and 2008/50/EC the Air Quality Directive 
with extended time limits for countries that so request. Also, the calculation of allowances under the 
European Union Emissions Trading System, under Directive 2003/87/EC, which covers nitrogen oxide 
is based on historical emissions.  
 172. See J. P. Hettlingh et al., The Use of Critical Loads in Emission Reduction Agreements in 
Europe, 85 WATER, AIR, AND SOIL POLLUTION 2381, 2381–88 (1995) (describing methods and 
outcomes). 
 173. Id. at 2381. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. The periodic reports using the GAINS model to the Task Force for Integrated Assessment 
Modeling and the EMEP Steering Committee in the treaty can be found at http://www.unece.org/ 
env/lrtap/taskforce/tfiam/welcome.html.  
 177. See Markus Amman et al., Cost-effective Control of Air Quality and Green House Gasses in 
Europe: Model and Policy Applications, 26 ENVTL. MODELING AND SOFTWARE 1489 (2011). 
 178. Thomas Gehring, Treaty-making and Treaty Evolution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 22. 
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the Conference of the Parties of LRTAP has created an Implementation 
Committee for non-adversarial dispute resolution.
179
 The Implementation 
Committee reviews compliance with reporting obligations and prepares in-
depth reviews of compliance with specified obligations in individual 
protocols.
 
The Implementation Committee will submit its conclusions 
concerning a non-compliant party, usually a request for a progress report 
on compliance, to the Executive Body, who has the final authority.
180
 This 
non-adversarial process supports the preventative goal of long-term 
participation of the non-compliant party.  
1. Unilateral Enforcement and the Pakootas Case 
Environmental cooperation between Canada and the United States has 
not been without its bumps and twists in the road. In the wake of the Trail 
Smelter controversy in the 1990s, the forum of the dispute was abruptly 
switched to the U.S. national court system. The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (―EPA‖) joined a claim by private parties under U.S. 
environmental law against the Canadian company, which in turn raised the 
concern that the United States was attempting to apply its environmental 
regulation extraterritorially.
181
 In the late 1990s, Teck Cominco was the 
defendant again for the alleged annual discharge of up to 145,000 tons of 
waste in the form of slag (a byproduct of the lead and zinc smeltering 
plant) into the Columbia River from 1906 to 1995.
182
 In August 1999, the 
Colville Tribes
183
 requested that the EPA study the contamination of the 
Columbia River‘s portion located in Washington State.184 In March 2003, 
the EPA completed its site assessment and concluded that the upper 
Columbia River site could be listed on its National Priorities List (―NPL‖) 
 
 
 179. See LRTAP Executive Body Decision 1997/2, available at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/ 
executivebody/eb_decision.html. 
 180. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS OF 
THE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE AND PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE (2011), available 
at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/eia/documents/ImplementationCommittee/2011_ 
Structure_and_functions__operating_rules_etc/Implementation_Committee_procedures_rules.e.pdf. 
 181. See Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter: Is What‟s Past Prologue? The EPA Blazes 
a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 313–14 (2005); Libin Zhang, Pakootas v. Teck 
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 552 (2007). 
 182. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., No. CV–04–256–AAM, 2004 WL 2578982, at *1, 
*3 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004). 
 183. This group is described as an Indian Tribe. Today, over 9000 descendants of twelve 
aboriginal tribes of Native Americans are enrolled in the Colville Tribes. The Colville Reservation 
land base covers 1.4 million acres located in north central Washington. Demographics, THE 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION, http://www.colvilletribes.com/ 
demographics.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 184. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (―CERCLA‖).185 
The primary purpose of CERCLA is to allocate liability for hazardous 
waste releases.
186
 In doing so, it sets out a procedural framework and a 
funding mechanism (referred to colloquially as ―the Superfund‖) to ensure 
the identification and clean-up of toxic waste sites.
187
 If an entity has fallen 
within its strict liability conditions, CERCLA can impose a duty on 
specific persons (―potentially responsible parties‖ or ―PRP‖s) to repay the 
fund for remediation or remediate themselves.
188
 CERCLA strict liability 
attaches when three conditions are satisfied: (1) the site at which there is 
an actual or threatened release of hazardous substances is a ―facility‖ 
under § 9601(9); (2) a ―release‖ or ―threatened release‖ of a hazardous 
substance from the facility has occurred, § 9607(a)(4); and (3) the party is 
within one of the four classes of potentially responsible persons subject to 
liability under § 9607(a).
189
 
On December 11, 2003, the EPA issued a Unilateral Administrative 
Order for Remedial Investigation/Remedial Study (the ―UAO‖) against 
Teck, with which Teck did not comply.
190
 The EPA did not take further 
action; instead, plaintiffs Joseph A. Pakootas and Donald Michel of the 
Colville Tribes exercised their private right of enforcement on Teck‘s 
compliance with the EPA-issued UAO, pursuant to the ―citizen suit‖ 
provision of CERCLA
191
 which allows for private parties to ―step into the 
shoes‖ of the EPA for injunctive relief. 
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.
192
 was filed with the Eastern 
District Court of Washington and later appealed to the Ninth Circuit of the 
U.S. federal court system.
193
 The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief and 
penalties for clean up and non-compliance of the UAO.
194
 The state of 
Washington also joined as a plaintiff to the suit pursuant to CERCLA.
195
 
 
 
 185. Id.  
 186. CERCLA Overview, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last visited Sept. 
27, 2012). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1073–74.  
 190. For the related cover letter and text by the EPA to Teck relating to the UAO, see Region 10, 
Region 10: Pacific Northwest, Enforcement, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/R10/CLEANUP.NSF/ 
UCR/Enforcement (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (2011). 
 192. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., No. CV–04–256–AAM, 2004 WL 2578982, at *1 
(E.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2004). 
 193. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., 452 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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Defendant Teck moved to dismiss the suit by both plaintiffs for lack of 
personal jurisdiction as well as a failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.
196
 Teck argued that because CERCLA cannot apply 
extra-territorially to a Canadian defendant, there was no proper cause of 
action.
197
 In denying this motion, the U.S. district court found CERCLA 
could be applied extraterritorially against the Canadian entity Teck.
198
 
Such a position was striking given that American law contains a 
presumption that its law will not be automatically applied extraterritorially 
unless specific Congressional intent provides otherwise.
199
 The district 
court insisted that a clear Congressional intent did exist to remedy 
domestic issues in situations regarding adverse effects within U.S. territory 
with respect to foreign parties.
200
 The district court held that it would 
constitute ―legal fiction‖ to distinguish between and bifurcate Teck 
Cominco into separate Canadian and American parts.
201
 The district court 
also held that Pakootas had stated a valid claim under CERCLA.
202
 
Specifically, Teck was a ―person‖ (pursuant to §9601) who could be found 
liable as a potentially responsible person with regard to the ―facility‖ 
(§9601(9)), where a ―release‖ or ―threatened release‖ occurred 
(§9607(a)(4)) in the upper Columbia River section of Washington state.
203
 
Teck appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
204
 
Following Teck‘s filing, but prior to hearing of the case, the EPA and 
Teck reached a settlement agreement, which compelled the EPA to drop 
its suit against Teck.
205
 However, the other plaintiffs, namely the Pakootas 
and the U.S. state of Washington, were not parties to the EPA-Teck 
settlement agreement.
206
 Thus, the remaining plaintiffs could still take the 
case forward based on their claims of the UAO violation and related civil 
penalties. 
 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1071 (citing Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc. 2004 WL 2578982, at *1, *17–18 
(E.D. Wash. 2004)). 
 199. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
 200. Pakootas, 2004 WL 2578982, at *17.  
 201. Id. at 6. 
 202. Id. at 18. 
 203. Id. at 10–11. 
 204.  Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 205. The settlement agreement can be found at the EPA website at http://www.epa.gov/ 
newsroom/pdf/teckcominco.pdf, and also at the Teck website at https://encrypted.google.com/#hl= 
en&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&q=teck+epa+settlement&oq=teck+epa+sett&gs_l=hp.1.0.33i21 
.1827.4711.0.7767.13.13.0.0.0.0.1113.4440.0j5j6j7-2.13.0.les%3B..0.0...1c.1.B5epQG7fwi8&pbx=1& 
bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=c7cc1d5b71cea433&biw=1574&bih=918. 
 206. See id. 
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Interestingly, in its 2006 decision, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied the exact ―legal fiction‖ that the lower district court 
denounced.
207
 Specifically, the Court held that it was Teck‘s Canadian 
―facility‖ that ―released‖ the ―hazardous substances‖ into the upper 
Columbia River in Washington state.
208
 Under CERCLA, a ―facility‖ can 
be defined as ―any site or area where a hazardous substance has . . . come 
to be located.‖209 The Court also stressed that CERCLA‘s intent was to 
impose liability for pollution site clean-ups, as opposed to the regulation 
of such substance releases-that the slag released into the upper Columbia 
River could be linked to Teck, which in turn, could constitute a ―release‖ 
under CERCLA that covers passive migration of hazardous substances 
into the environment.
210
 
The Court held that such ―release‖ was distinguishable and separate 
from the original discharge from the Trail Smelter located in Trail, British 
Columbia, and further, that such ―release‖ or ―threatened release‖ occurred 
in the American subsidiary of Teck (located in the state of Washington), 
which is within U.S. territory and CERCLA‘s jurisdiction.211 In other 
words, the issue of whether CERCLA could be applied extraterritorially to 
Canada (or more broadly, to any non-U.S. party) was conveniently 
avoided in this instance, as was the issue of whether the EPA could 
impose liability upon Canadian parties regarding releases of hazardous 
substances that directly or indirectly enter and cause damage to U.S. 
interests (which the EPA generally does not consider to be within its 
normal purview).
212
 The court explained that as CERCLA was primarily 
intended to allocate liability, this did not constitute extraterritorial 
application of U.S. environmental regulation.
213
 
Although the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, certiorari 
was denied.
214
 Thus, the legal effect was that the 2006 decision of the U.S. 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered the final decision on the matter 
relating to the dispute between Teck and the EPA (separate from the 
ongoing dispute between Teck and the state of Washington and Pakootas).  
 
 
 207. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079. 
 208. Id. 
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2012). 
 210. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Inc., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 211. Id. at 1068–69. 
 212. EPA interview with Jasper Kim in Seattle, Washington, United States (July 9, 2009). 
 213. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1073. 
 214. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. v. Pakootas, 552 U.S. 1095 (2008) (denying cert). 
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The United States has invited international criticism for its unilateral 
approach. One scholar notes: 
In the last two decades, the United States has disengaged from the 
traditional sources of international law, declining to enter into 
multilateral conventions or undertake new international legal 
obligations. Concomitant with this retreat—filling the void left by 
U.S. disengagement—the number of U.S. lawsuits where American 
laws are applied extraterritorially to solve global problems has 
grown. This trend, however, is not peculiar to the United States. 
Increasingly other countries are also applying their laws 
extraterritorially to exert international influence and solve 
transboundary challenges.
215
 
When is unilateral action justified? As Dan Bodansky and Gregory 
Schaffer point out, neither consent-based international environmental law 
(treaties) nor transnational environmental law based on unilateral actions 
is inherently superior for environmental protection, even though it appears 
that consent-based international environmental law is more legitimate.
216
 
Both are imperfect tools and should be compared by their tradeoffs.
217
 
Unilateralism should be retained as an option for serious environmental 
harm, especially if intergovernmental actions are too little or too late.
218
 
In the instant case, we agree with Michael Robinson-Dorn that the U.S. 
court acted in accordance with the international law.
219
 In Pakootas, 
counsel for Teck argued that the suit would disrupt U.S.-Canadian 
relations and should be barred on the principle of international comity 
because it constituted extra-territorial application of the U.S. 
environmental laws.
220
 It contended that the two countries had concluded a 
relevant bilateral treaty on the subject matter which committed dispute 
resolution to the IJC; the Boundary Waters Treaty did not permit the use 
of private claims in national courts.
221
 However, Articles X and XI of the 
 
 
 215. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
815, 818 (2009); Zhang, supra note 181. 
 216. Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Unilateralism and International Law, 1 TRANSNAT‘L 
ENVTL. L. 31 (2012). 
 217. Id. at 38. 
 218. Id. The authors raise climate change as an outstanding example. 
 219. Robinson-Dorn, supra note 181, at 301–04. 
 220. Appellant‘s Opening Brief Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 221. Id. 
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treaty make clear that submitting an issue to the IJC is voluntary for the 
States,
222
 and Canada had declined to refer the dispute to the IJC. 
Although it is universally accepted under customary international law 
that the sovereign rights of States places limits on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of criminal law,
223
 there is less consensus concerning civil law 
or environmental law jurisdiction.
224
 The United States and Canada 
generally recognize the effects doctrine for prescriptive jurisdiction, 
whereby a State may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over ―conduct 
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within 
its territory,‖ so long as the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.225 To 
determine reasonableness, the courts should consider, among other factors, 
―the extent to which the activity . . . has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory.‖226 
2. Using Private Law to Recover for Transboundary Environmental 
Harm 
The Pakootas case is consistent with a broad trend towards the 
transnationalization of domestic environmental law.
227
 Aside from the rare 
instances such as this when States attempt to apply their domestic laws to 
an out-of-state defendant, States have also facilitated private transborder 
resolution in national courts through treaties on ―reciprocal access to 
justice‖ on the principle of ―non-discrimination.‖228 Canada and the United 
States, for example, have concluded a reciprocal access treaty: the 
Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act.
229
 It states that: 
a person who suffers or is threatened with injury to his person or 
property in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution 
originating, or that may originate, in this jurisdiction has the same 
 
 
 222. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 26. 
 223. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 50, ¶ 70 (Feb. 
5). 
 224. See INT‘L B. ASS‘N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 124 
(2009), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=597D4FCC-2589-499F-
9D9B-0E392D045CD1p.68 [hereinafter IBA REPORT]. 
 225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 402(1)(c) 
(1987). 
 226. Id. § 403(2)(a). 
 227. See Faure & Betlem, supra note 102, at 59–60. 
 228. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Recommendation 
of the Council on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Nov. 14, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 242. 
 229. The act is implemented on a state by state basis in the United States. The Canadian version 
can be found at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1t4. 
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rights to relief with respect to the injury or threatened injury, and 
may enforce those rights in this jurisdiction, as if the injury or 
threatened injury occurred in this jurisdiction.
230
 
The court will apply the law where the suit is brought.
231
 More generally, 
States have promoted the expansion of civil liability internationally 
through various treaty regimes dealing with environmental harm and 
mutual access to court systems in civil disputes between private parties.
232
 
States use these procedures rather than the traditional rules of state 
responsibility or international dispute settlement in transnational disputes 
probably because they do not want to establish legal precedents that cause 
them to be responsible for private actors in their territories. The practical 
benefit of the dispute for States is that it localizes the dispute while 
avoiding disruptions in international relations that could affect other 
spheres of relations. Among the moral advantages of this approach, it 
confines the dispute to the true parties of the dispute and it conforms with 
the polluter pays principle. In situations where harm is caused by many 
actors and the victims are widespread, such as with transboundary air 
pollution, prevention-centered treaties are the appropriate legal solution. 
Such private suits on transboundary environmental harm facilitated by 
treaties are part of what Tseming Yang has termed ―the globalization‖ of 
environmental law:  
Advancements in global information flows have not only made it 
easier for countries to borrow legal and regulatory policy 
innovations from each other, they have also created closer linkages 
between international and national legal systems. Elements of 
national environmental law have been ―uploaded‖ into international 
agreements and international legal norms have in turn been 
―downloaded‖ into national and regional systems. 
. . . .  
 
 
 230. Id. § 3. 
 231. Id. § 4. 
 232. See INT‘L L. ASS‘N, SECOND REPORT ON TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (discussing efforts to remove obstacles to transnational enforcement in 
the European Communities as well as global private law efforts).  
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. . . In the brave new world of global environmental law, the focus is 
on ―transnational legal processes, governmental and non-
governmental networks, and judicial influence and cooperation 
across borders.‖233 
III. THE CONTEXT FOR TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN ASIA 
It would be an obvious mistake to attempt to unilaterally transplant 
western legal solutions to transboundary harm in Northeast Asia without 
considering the legal-institutional, military-strategic and cultural context 
for the treatment of environmental disputes. Appraising what may be well 
received in Northeast Asia at any moment in time is an especially difficult 
task and is exacerbated when considering the level of globalization and 
economic dynamism of the region. Below we discuss the status of 
environmental dispute resolution and some considerations from the legal 
culture and legal infrastructure that may shape the receptiveness of 
Northeast Asians to various proposals for legal resolution of 
transboundary air pollution problems.  
A. Low Rate of Diffusion of Environmental Litigation 
Compared to Europe and North America, there has been a relatively 
lower rate of development of environmental law and diffusion of 
environmental litigation within the national legal systems in the Northeast 
Asian countries. In Korea, a great many environmental disputes have 
arisen in relation to massive government development projects, such as 
dams, nuclear sites and road construction projects.
234
 According to Lee 
Jae-Hyup, these disputes have quickly taken on national dimensions 
through environmental activism because of concern that the government is 
sacrificing environmental values for economic development.
235
 Lee posits 
that ―[t]he lack of public participation in the decision-making process for 
environmental policy and the forceful implementation of the policy on the 
part of bureaucrats also contribute to the generation of environmental 
disputes.‖236 The Ministry of Environment administers an Environmental 
Dispute Resolution Commission, which has a very successful settlement 
 
 
 233. Yang & Percival, supra note 108, at 623, 625. 
 234. Lee Jae-Hyup, Negotiating Values and Law: Environmental Dispute Resolution in Korea, in 
LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA 199, 201, 203–08 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2004). 
 235. Id. at 202.  
 236. Id. at 201. 
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rate for administrative conciliation of disputes other than the major 
government development projects.
237
 However, many cases are still 
resolved informally through demonstrations or through political 
negotiations.
238
 Lee believes that the prevalence of informal and political 
dispute resolution in environmental matters is due to frustration with the 
weak enforcement record of the courts.
239
 
Examples of successful outcomes for plaintiffs in air pollution 
litigation
240
 are relatively rare.
241
 There are few environmental laws in 
South Korea with strict liability and none comparable to CERCLA (i.e., 
containing a procedural mechanism for private enforcement against an 
array of potentially responsible parties) that facilitate enforcement, 
remediation and compensation many years after the fact. Citizens may file 
a tort claim for damages from air pollution under Article 750 of the Civil 
Code of South Korea under which they need only prove a sufficient 
probability that the harm was caused by the tort.
242
 Most recently, the 
Seoul Central District Court dismissed a claim filed by a seven-year-old 
asthma sufferer and twenty-two others against the city of Seoul and five 
car companies under Article 750.
243
 The petition also requested 
compensation from the city of Seoul under Article 5 of the National 
Compensation Act, an injunction against the emissions from the cars in the 
city of Seoul and a demand to bring air quality to the level of WHO air 
quality guidelines.
244
 In rejecting the tort claim, the court acknowledged 
the argument of the car companies that there was a failure to take into 
account China‘s contribution of urban fine particulate matter pollution, 
which precluded a finding of liability.
245
 
 
 
 237. Id. at 204. 
 238. Id. at 203. 
 239. Id. at 210. 
 240. But see Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 72da1774, Dec. 10, 1974 (S. Kor.) (exhibiting an early case 
awarding damages to an orchard owner for sulfur dioxide from a neighboring power plant). 
 241. This is in contrast to the relatively long history of successful air pollution litigation in Japan. 
See Eri Oska, Revaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J. INT‘L AND COMP. 
L. 393 (2009). Eri Oska discusses the evolution of the State Administrative Compensation system for 
air pollution victims through successive litigation. Id. at 413–21. In 2007, Tokyo air pollution victims 
achieved a settlement with the State, the Tokyo metropolitan government, the Metropolitan 
Expressway Public Corporation, and seven companies that manufacture and sell diesel vehicles that 
requires the government to set up a health care subsidy system for asthma and bronchitis sufferers and 
ensure air quality, while the car companies must pay 1.2 billion yen in damages. Id. at 421. 
 242. Minbeob [Civil Act], Act. No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, art. 750 (S. Kor.). 
 243. Seoul Central District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2007 kahab 16309, at 1, Feb. 3, 2010 (S. Kor.). 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 30; see also Nathan Schwartzman, Korea‟s First Major Air Pollution Law Suit to 
Conclude Soon, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT.COM (Jan. 15, 2010), http://asiancorrespondent.com/27617/ 
koreas-first-major-air-pollution-lawsuit-to-conclude-soon. 
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B. Adherence to Territorial Principle of Prescriptive and Judicial 
Jurisdiction 
With the exception of the treaties the countries participate in for civil 
liability,
246
 China, Korea and Japan have largely remained outside of the 
transnationalization of environmental law, specifically, and even civil law, 
generally. Overall, there is lower ―interoperability‖ of national court 
systems in Northeast Asia. Even in commercial disputes, Asian plaintiffs 
generally do not participate in the grand American tradition of forum 
shopping. Strict reciprocity is still required for the recognition of foreign 
judgments in the three countries, discouraging foreign plaintiffs‘ recourse 
to justice in the region.
247
 At the same time, the Chinese justice system, 
which is at a different stage of development, is in many ways struggling to 
attain enforceability of judgments on behalf of domestic plaintiffs.
248
 
Accordingly, foreign plaintiffs appear to be a long way away from 
enjoying the benefits of reciprocal justice for environmental claims in both 
countries. The authors are unaware of any environmental case to date in 
South Korea with a non-native plaintiff, although cross-claims have been 
filed in oil spill cases.
249
 
In Northeast Asia, unilateralism exercised by an environmental 
domestic regulator could cause a far more serious disruption in foreign 
relations than has occurred in North America. State practice has 
consistently emphasized diplomatic channels to address transnational 
concerns, particularly in the field of transboundary pollution.
250
 Also, 
South Korea‘s laws on public administration forbid independent 
international actions by South Korea‘s Ministry of the Environment. The 
 
 
 246. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, 17 I.L.M. 546, 
available at http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-
for-the-prevention-of-pollution-from-ships-%28marpol%29.aspx [hereinafter MARPOL]; Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 
Mar. 22, 1989, 928 I.L.M. 657, available at http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/Textof 
theConvention/tabid/1275/Default.aspx [hereinafter Basel Convention]; Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727. 
 247. In the case of Korea, this is required in the Civil Code. Korean Civil Code, art. 217(4). In 
Japan there is a condition for a ―mutual guarantee‖ equivalent to reciprocity in the Civil Execution 
Act, art. 200(v). In China, the reciprocity requirement is expressed in the Law of Civil Procedure of 
the People‘s Republic of China, Chapter XXIX, art. 268. 
 248. See Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of Civil Judgments in China, 1995 CHINA Q. 65, 66; 
see also Mo Zhang, International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese 
Judicial System, 25 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 90 (2002) (concerning China‘s difficulties with 
the execution of foreign civil judgments). 
 249. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008do1192, Apr. 23, 2009 (S. Kor.).  
 250. See infra Part III.C. 
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Foreign Affairs power has been granted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Economy under the Government Organization Act, which it has 
exercised now until exclusively.
251
 In terms of foreign relations law in 
South Korea, South Korea adheres to the territorial principle for judicial 
and prescriptive jurisdiction generally. The courts will exercise 
―international jurisdiction‖ only if a ―substantial connection‖ exists 
between the parties or the case and the Republic of Korea.
252
 The law that 
will be applied in an international tort case will be the law where the tort 
was committed, not where the damage occurred.
253
 Express extraterritorial 
effect can only be found in South Korea‘s antitrust laws, based on effects 
in the Republic of Korea, which is similar to the effects principle of 
prescriptive jurisdiction in U.S. law.
254
 This is consistent with the overall 
attitude of respect for legislative and judicial sovereignty in Northeast 
Asia.  
C. Patterns of Northeast Asian Participation in Environmental Treaties 
In order to understand the legal context for environmental dispute 
resolution under international law in Northeast Asia, it is helpful to review 
the state practice of the Northeast Asian countries in environmental 
treaties. China, Japan and South Korea have signed or joined various 
worldwide multilateral international environmental treaties that provide 
dispute resolution mechanisms as well as monitoring and non-compliance 
measures inducing compliance. Amongst themselves, the agreements that 
have relevance to regional transboundary environmental pollution in 
Northeast Asia are far more limited. As a general rule, they contain no 
binding obligations, monitoring or compliance procedures or adversarial 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
 
 251. Government Organizations Act, Law No. 1, art. 30 (July 17, 1948). Recently, however the 
LCGGA delegated authority for international cooperation in matters of climate change to the PCGG, 
an inter-agency, cabinet level body, supra note 82. 
 252. Kukjaesaboeb [The Act on Private International Law], Act No. 6465, Apr. 2001, art. 2(1) 
(S. Kor.). 
 253. INT‘L L. ASS‘N, SECOND REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION § 2.1 (2004). The report notes a trend of allowing 
transnational jurisdiction for torts in line with the preliminary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters submitted to the First Part of a Diplomatic 
Conference of the HCCH held in June 2001. 
 254. See IBA REPORT, supra note 224, at 68.  
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1. Multilateral Environmental Treaties to which the Three Countries 
are Members, Their Implementing Procedures and Their Dispute 
Resolution Provisions 
Each of the three countries has joined various universal environmental 
conventions which can roughly be categorized into five categories of 
environmental concern: chemicals and hazardous waste, water pollution, 
air pollution, food safety and biodiversity. These treaties include the 
following: 
Treaty Subject Matter Content 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants255 (the 
―Stockholm Convention‖) 
Persistent and 
hazardous 
chemicals 
Bans production, trade and use of persistent 
organic pollutants (―POPs‖) 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade 
(Rotterdam Convention)256 
Hazardous 
chemicals and 
pesticides 
Obligates the parties to ensure that the 
export of a chemical covered by the 
convention takes place only with the prior 
informed consent 
Basel convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal257 (the ―Basel 
Convention‖) 
Transboundary 
transfer of 
hazardous 
wastes 
Controls the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes and hazardous recyclable 
materials and to promote the 
environmentally sound management of 
these wastes and materials 
Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species258 (the 
―CITES Convention‖) 
Trade in 
endangered 
species 
Identifies endangered species of wildlife 
and plants and establishes cooperation for 
the regulation of trade of the species 
through a permit system 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity259  
Conservation of 
bological 
diversity  
Obligates parties to take measures to 
conserve biodiversity, cooperate on open 
access to genetic resources    
 
 
 255. See Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 
119, 40 I.L.M. 532, available at http://chm.pops.int/Convention/ConventionText/tabid/2232/Default 
.aspx.  
 256. See Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHEMICALS/98/17 (Sept. 10, 
1998), available at http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/Overview/TextoftheConvention/tabid/1048/ 
language/en-US/Default.aspx. 
 257. See Basel Convention, supra note 246. 
 258. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 
U.N.T.S. 243. 
 259. Convention on Biological Diversity June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 143; 31 I.L.M. 818 
(1992). 
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Treaty Subject Matter Content 
UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 260 (―UNCLOS‖) 
Use of Global 
Marine 
Resources 
Prevents, reduces and controls pollution 
from land-based sources, seabed activities 
subject to national jurisdiction, activities in 
the high sea area, dumping, vessels and the 
atmosphere 
International convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships261 (―MARPOL‖) 
Civil liability for 
pollution from 
ships 
Creates a civil liability regime for release of 
oil, chemicals, harmful substances in 
packaged form, sewage and garbage by 
ships into the marine environment 
Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer262 (the 
―Montreal Protocol‖) 
Ozone-depleting 
substances 
Phases out the production and consumption 
of chemicals that reduce atmospheric ozone 
levels and bans trade in them 
Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change263 (the ―Kyoto 
Protocol‖) 
Greenhouse 
gasses 
Provides that developed countries commit 
to specific limits on their emissions of 
greenhouse gases 
Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety264 
(the ―Biosafety Protocol‖) 
Living Modified 
Organisms 
Requires countries intending to export a 
LMO to seek prior consent from importing 
country 
 
a. Implementing Mechanisms 
Traditional adversarial dispute resolution has been rendered far less 
significant in recent years by the trend toward non-compliance 
implementing procedures.
265
 In the treaties above, non-compliance 
procedures exist alongside, but without prejudice to, adversarial dispute 
resolution clauses. Resolution according to non-compliance procedures 
has generally become the standard practice for dispute resolution in 
international environmental law, with countries rarely resorting to 
adversarial dispute resolution under international environmental treaties.
266
 
 
 
 260. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_ 
convention.htm. 
 261. See MARPOL, supra note 246. 
 262. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf. 
 263. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
 264. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 
2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, available at http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/. 
 265. See TULIO TREVES ET AL., NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (2009). 
 266. Some recent exceptions to this reluctance to use traditional international tribunals for 
transboundary environmental disputes are as follows: the MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Case No. 
10, Order of Dec. 2001, 41 I.L.M. 405 (dispute resolution under UNCLOS); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project, supra note 135 (dispute resolution under the Treaty of Budapest); Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Case Nos. 3 and 4, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, available at http://www 
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Non-adversarial, non-compliance procedures are designed to de-escalate 
disputes and solicit technical support for non-compliance at the early 
stages. Non-compliance can be self-reported or reported by another treaty 
party. Most often, a standing compliance committee will report back to the 
plenary Conference of the Parties, which has ultimate authority based on 
consensus.
267
 Decisions by bodies vested with powers for judging non-
compliance are often just recommendations, such as a suggestion to create 
a compliance plan or advice on implementation.
268
 
The above multilateral environmental treaties contain a variety of 
compliance incentives, including both sanctions and positive incentives. 
Sanctions may include financial penalties or countermeasures primarily 
with respect to trade, such as those found in the Montreal Protocol and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (―CITES‖ conventions).269 Positive incentives, which are far 
more universal, may include financial and technical assistance.
270
 
b. Adversarial Dispute Resolution 
Side-by-side with implementation procedures, the multilateral 
conventions ratified by the three countries allow traditional dispute 
resolution.
271
 Although details of these provisions vary, the procedures are 
similar for most of the treaties. As a first step to resolve disputes, most of 
the environmental treaties above require that parties to a dispute first seek 
 
 
.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/Order.27.08.99.E.pdf (dispute resolution under 
UNCLOS); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 135 (Apr. 20) (dispute 
resolution under the Statute of the River Uruguay), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
135/15877.pdf. 
 267. See for example, point nine of the non-compliance procedures of the Montreal Protocol, 
available at http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/non_compliance_procedure.php. 
 268. See An Indicative List of Measures that Might be Taken by the Conference of the Parties in 
Respect of Non-compliance with the Protocol, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM OZONE 
SECRETARIAT, http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/indicative_list_on_non_compliance.php 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 269. For a review of the history of trade restrictions under the Montreal Protocol, see Jacob 
Werksman, Trade Sanctions under the Montreal Protocol, 1 R. OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INT‘L 
ENVTL. L. 69 (1992); Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 270.  See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 262, art. 10. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
Technical and Financial Assistance, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 964 (Daniel 
Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (discussing first generation financial assistance through MEA trust funds, 
as in the Basel Convention and in the CITES Convention, as well as cooperation between second 
generation financial mechanisms and bodies established MEAs). 
 271. About half of all MEAs contain adversarial dispute resolution clause alongside with and as 
an alternative to non-adversarial non-compliance procedures. CESARE P.R. ROMANO, PEACEFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 39 (2000). 
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amicable settlement through consultation or negotiation.
272
 The Montreal 
Protocol, for example, provides that parties to a dispute may request 
mediation by a third party.
273
 When these initial attempts fail, some of the 
conventions provide that the parties may agree to one or both of the 
following means of compulsory dispute settlement: (i) submission of the 
dispute to the ICJ and/or (ii) arbitration in accordance with procedures 
adopted by the relevant parties.
274
 If the parties have not accepted either of 
the above means of compulsory dispute settlement, the conventions 
usually require that the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any 
party, to conciliation; the conciliation commission makes a 
recommendation that must be considered in good faith.
275
 
In some cases, a country has made a specific declaration rejecting 
certain dispute resolution mechanisms provided in a treaty to a certain 
degree. For example, China and South Korea declared that, amongst other 
things, they do not accept any of the procedures with respect to boundary 
limitations and disputes concerning military activities.
276
 Further, it should 
be noted that some treaties and conventions require local remedies for a 
given dispute to be exhausted before such dispute is submitted to either the 
ICJ or arbitration proceedings.
277
 
2. Bilateral Agreements of the Three Countries Concerning Shared 
Natural Resources 
Separate from the multilateral environmental treaties and conventions 
discussed above, the three countries have entered into bilateral agreements 
concerning natural resources. Notably, among such bilateral agreements, 
no environmental agreement provides a legally binding dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
 
 
 272. See, e.g., Rotterdam Convention, supra note 256, art. 20, ¶ 1 (―Parties shall settle any dispute 
between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be settled through 
negotiation or other peaceful means of their own choice‖); Basel Convention, supra note 246, art. 20 
(―In case of a dispute between Parties as to the interpretation or application of, or compliance with, this 
Convention or any protocol thereto, they shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or 
any other peaceful means of their own choice.‖). 
 273. Montreal Protocol, supra note 262, art. 11. 
 274. See, e.g., Rotterdam Convention, supra note 256, art. 20, ¶ 2. 
 275. See, e.g., id. art. 20, ¶ 6. 
 276. UNCLOS, supra note 260, Declarations and Reservations, available at http://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf (declaring that Section 2 of 
Part XV of UNCLOS, which provides compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, does not 
apply to certain categories of disputes). 
 277. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 260, art. 295. 
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On the other hand, some investment-related bilateral agreements 
provide the classical two-step dispute resolution mechanisms as mandated 
by Article 33 of the UN Charter (i.e., amicable negotiation and diplomacy 
followed by arbitration).
278
 With respect to procedural rules for arbitration, 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States
279
 (―Washington Convention‖) and the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
280
 have been adopted in some treaties and 
conventions, whereas other treaties and conventions are silent.
281
 
a. South Korea and Japan 
In 1965, under the Park Jung Hee administration, South Korea and 
Japan entered into a series of bilateral agreements concerning the loans 
provided by the Japanese government to the South Korean government 
and various other issues.
282
 Among such agreements are the Exchanges of 
Notes Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Disputes 
(―South Korea-Japan Dispute Settlement Agreement‖)283 and the 
Agreement on Fisheries, with Annex, Exchanges of Notes, Exchanges of 
Letters, Agreed Minutes and Record Discussions (―South Korea-Japan 
Fisheries Agreement‖),284 each signed on June 22, 1965. 
Under the South Korea-Japan Dispute Settlement Agreement, any 
dispute between the two countries shall be resolved ―primarily through 
diplomatic channels.‖285 If such efforts through these diplomatic channels 
fail, the two countries shall seek settlement by conciliation in accordance 
 
 
 278. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
 279. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 280. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 
31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf. 
 281. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 260, art. 188(2)(c) (adopting the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules).  
 282. See, e.g., Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Japan-S. Kor., 
June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 44; Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and 
Claims and on Economic Co-operation (with Protocols, Exchanges of Notes and Agreed Minutes), 
Japan-S. Kor., June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 173. 
 283. Exchanges of Notes Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Disputes, 
Japan-S. Kor., June 22, 1965, 584 U.N.T.S. 147 [hereinafter South Korea-Japan Dispute Settlement 
Agreement]. 
 284. Agreement on Fisheries (with Annex, Exchanges of Notes, Exchanges of Letters, Agreed 
Minutes and Record of Discussions), Japan-S. Kor., June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 51. 
 285. See South Korea-Japan Dispute Settlement Agreement, supra note 283, at 149. 
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with procedures to be agreed upon between them.
286
 Since the scope of 
this agreement is undefined therein, it may be interpreted as being 
applicable to any disputes of whatever nature, including environmental 
disputes between the two countries, unless agreed otherwise by another 
binding agreement between them. Under the Fisheries Agreement, 
pursuant to which various fishing, economic and research zones and a 
joint commission have been established, any dispute regarding 
interpretation or application of the agreement shall be settled through 
diplomatic channels.
287
 If such diplomatic efforts fail, the dispute shall be 
settled through an arbitration board of three arbitrators.
288
 
In 1998, the countries entered into a new, supplementary fisheries 
agreement related to their Exclusive Economic Zones pending final 
delimitation of the zones under the UNCLOS convention.
289
 The dispute 
resolution provisions in Article 13 stipulate non-compulsory arbitration.
290
 
It also establishes a ―Korea-Japan Fisheries Committee‖ to consult, and 
render recommendations and binding decisions (if agreed to by 
representatives of both sides) to both Governments on the various matters 
relating to the implementation of the Agreement.
291
  
On June 29, 1993, the two countries entered into an Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, with a 
comprehensive coverage of environmental issues-including pollution 
abatement and control, which comprises air pollution control, water 
pollution control, marine pollution control, soil pollution control, waste 
management and resource recovery, conservation of ecosystem and 
biodiversity, prevention of anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system and other environment protection and improvement.
292
 Although 
the agreement does not provide a dispute resolution mechanism, it does 
create a joint committee on environmental cooperation.
293
 
 
 
 286. Id. at 149–50. 
 287. The South Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement, supra note 284, art. IX, ¶ 1. 
 288. Id. art. IX, ¶ 2. 
 289. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning Fisheries (with Agreed 
Minutes and Annexes). Kagoshima, Nov. 28, 1998, UN Treaty No. 48295 (entered into force Jan. 22, 
1999) (registered on Feb. 2, 2011) (available in Korean at the website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/ 
read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=25&seqno=274385); see also Sun Pyo Kim,. The UNCLOS 
Convention and the New Fisheries Agreements in Northeast Asia, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND TRADE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Apr. 2012.  
 290. Id. at 5. 
 291. Id.  
 292. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, S. Korea-Japan, art. 4, 
June 29, 1993, 1752 U.N.T.S. 131. 
 293. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1. 
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b. South Korea and China 
South Korea and China entered into the Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation on October 28, 1993, under which they agreed to cooperate in 
various areas including the following pollution abatement and control, 
comprising air pollution control, water pollution control, coastal and 
marine pollution control, agricultural runoff and pesticide control, solid 
waste management and resource recovery, control of transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous solid wastes, and management of 
environment and natural resources.
294
 In order to coordinate and facilitate 
cooperative activities under the agreement, a joint committee on 
Environmental Cooperation has been established.
295
 
In 2000, the countries entered into a fisheries agreement in mutually 
disputed areas pending final delimitation of their Exclusive Economic 
Zones under the UNCLOS convention: The Agreement Concerning 
Fisheries Between the Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of 
China.
296
 There are no dispute settlement provisions. It also establishes a 
―Korea-China Fisheries Committee‖ with the power to decide matters 
regarding the conservation and management measures and it can 
recommend to the Government of each Contracting Party measures 
relating to fishing access in Article 13. 
c. China and Japan 
China and Japan signed the Fishery Agreement on August 15, 1975,
297
 
and the Trade Agreement on January 5, 1974,
298
 both of which cover 
certain environmental issues. However, neither of the agreements provides 
a binding dispute resolution mechanism. After the UNCLOS convention 
took effect, in 1997, the two nations entered into a new fisheries 
agreement in their declared Exclusive Economic Zones areas pending final 
delimitation of the zones: the Agreement Concerning Fisheries between 
 
 
 294. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, S. Kor.-China, art. 3, Oct. 28, 1993, 1767 
U.N.T.S. 71. 
 295. Id. art. 4, ¶ 1. 
 296. The Agreement Concerning Fisheries Between the Republic of Korea and the Peoples 
Republic of China, Beijing, Aug. 3, 2000, UN Treaty No. 14839 (available in Korean at the web-site 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, http://www.mofat.go.kr/ 
webmodule/htsboard/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=25&seqno=274386); see 
Kim, supra note 289, at 12. 
 297. Fishery Agreement (with Annexes, Exchanges of Notes, and Agreed Minutes), China-Japan, 
Aug. 15, 1975, 1103 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 298. Trade Agreement, China-Japan, Jan. 5, 1974, 1002 U.N.T.S. 89. 
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Japan and the Peoples Republic of China.
299
 There are no dispute 
settlement provisions. It also establishes a ―China-Japan Fisheries 
Committee‖ the power to decide matters regarding the conservation and 
management measures and it can recommend to the government of each 
contracting party measures relating to fishing access in Article 13. 
D. Addressing the Environment Through Industrial Policy: Low Carbon-
Green Growth 
In Asia, a general and overarching concern with climate change has 
had a strong impact on domestic policies, even as the world has struggled 
to find a successor to the Kyoto protocol. In 2008, all three countries 
committed to substantial green stimulus packages against a backdrop of 
deepening and widening national policies to promote energy efficiency 
and renewable energy investment.
300
 China had by far the largest green 
stimulus package of any country in the world, which has subsequently 
fostered extraordinary growth in its wind and solar energy sectors.
301
 
Implicit in these actions appears to be the assumption that there is a first-
mover advantage for countries that develop green industries. 
South Korea has also moved aggressively to formally place 
environmentally protective industries and technologies at the center of its 
economic strategy, as exemplified by the announcement of its national 
green growth strategy in 2008.
302
 The strategy‘s long term implementation 
was institutionalized in the Low-Carbon Green Growth Act.
303
 While 
mandating targets on energy efficiency and GHG emissions in multiple 
sectors, it requires the government to carry out the ―greening‖ of the 
industrial base and to create new engines of economic growth based on 
green technologies.
304
 In South Korea, the widespread notion that 
environmental protection erodes national or business-level 
 
 
 299. See Agreement between Japan and the People's Republic of China concerning fisheries (with 
agreed minutes and annexes), Tokyo, Nov. 11, 1997, UN Treaty No. 48293; see also Kim, supra note 
289, at 18. 
 300.  See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, THE GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL, 
POLICY BRIEF (2009), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/A_Global_Green_New_Deal_Policy_ 
Brief.pdf. 
 301. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL: AN UPDATE 
FOR THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT 3 (2009), available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/Green% 
20Economy/G%2020%20policy%20brief%20FINAL.pdf. 
 302. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME: OVERVIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA‘S 
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR GREEN GROWTH (2010), available at http://www.unep.org/PDF/Press 
Releases/201004_unep_national_strategy.pdf. 
 303. See LCGG Act, supra note 41. 
 304. Id. art. 22. 
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competitiveness is being challenged outright by Green Growth‘s claim that 
environmental sustainability and growth are complimentary and 
synergistic.
305
 These actions by the South Korean government have done 
much to focus attention on climate change and dampen criticism that 
curbing pollution is bad for industry, thus perhaps making a regional treaty 
on transboundary pollution more acceptable to the industry and the public. 
IV. THE PATH TOWARD LEGALIZATION 
The countries that contribute most regionally to transboundary air 
pollution, namely South Korea, Japan and China, should move on from 
purely diplomatic fora to discuss solutions for transboundary air pollution. 
These solutions should implement legal principles and procedures while 
employing dedicated, permanent public institutions that would publicly 
monitor commitments. In accordance with Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration, a regional agreement to control transnational air pollution 
must strike the appropriate balance between the right to economic 
development and the duty to prevent the use of its territory to harm to 
other countries.
306
 Specifically, it must weigh China‘s burden of 
commitment as a developing country against the costs imposed on its 
neighbors by its emissions. But we believe this balance point lies 
substantially beyond the current level of mainly scientific cooperation and 
provision of technical aid to China by South Korea and Japan. It would be 
naive to assume that the technological solutions and regulatory standards 
devised for Europe and America will be adequate to protect contemporary 
Asia from the current environmental challenge due to its higher population 
density and dramatically accelerated pace of industrialization.  
To have a realistic and effective response to pollution in Asia, 
affirmative legal limits must be placed on the polluting conduct of all three 
countries through concrete mutual commitments to reduce or maintain 
emissions. Such a treaty should be designed to optimally address the 
critical nexus between energy-demand, air pollution and global warming 
in Asia. Treaty and regulatory precedents from Europe and North America 
can be updated for these purposes to reflect the current state of 
atmospheric science and epidemiological knowledge on the long-range 
 
 
 305. According to the Presidential Commission on Green Growth (―Green Growth Korea‖), the 
green growth strategy strives to find ―new engines of economic growth‖ by tackling climate change 
and the energy crisis. See Declaration of Low Carbon Green Growth as National Vision: From a 
History of Rapid Catch-up, Towards a Green Dream, GREEN GROWTH KOREA, http://www.green 
growth.go.kr/?page_id=42478 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 306. Rio Declaration, supra note 137. 
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transport of small particulate matter and the emerging low-carbon 
economy. 
A. Relevant International Environmental Law Norms 
The globalization of environmental law is leading to significant 
strengthening of domestic environmental norms throughout Northeast 
Asia, which is opening up new possibilities for legal solutions to the 
regional environmental problems. International environmental law 
principles and common environmental norms in the region can assist at the 
negotiating stage of treaties to establish common ground before 
identifying rules. As Beyerlin stated, ―Principles can be understood as 
norms that are first and foremost designed to give guidance to their future 
addressees for future conduct in rule-making processes as well as to shape 
the interpretation and application of rules already in existence.‖307 Below, 
we suggest the international law principles that we believe will be helpful 
to establish an approach towards negotiations and to structure the 
institutional mechanisms of the treaty. 
1. The Duty to Prevent Transboundary Environmental Harm and 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 
With reference to the Trail Smelter arbitration, in codifying customary 
international law on transboundary harm, the International Law 
Commission has stated that the ―State of origin shall take all appropriate 
measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event 
minimize the risk thereof.‖308 In other words, if there is a high risk of 
substantial harm outside of its jurisdiction due to activities within its own 
jurisdiction, a State must act in advance before the harm occurs. The Trail 
Smelter conclusions have been incorporated in modified form in Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.
309
 
This well-recognized rule of customary international law was again 
articulated in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
 
 
 307. Beyerlin, supra note 106. 
 308. Rep. of the Int‘l Law Comm‘n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001). 
 309. Stockhold Declaration on the Human Environment. Adopted June 16, 1972 at the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm. UN Doc. A/CONF 48/14/Rev. 1 at 3 
(1973) 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION OVER SOUTH KOREA 619 
 
 
 
 
Development
310
 and cited as the guiding principle for a number of major 
international environmental law treaties.
311
 
Notwithstanding the conclusion of the Trail Smelter tribunal that 
Canada was responsible for the harm caused by the smelter, the 
contemporary expression of the ―no harm‖ rule does not mean that States 
will always be internationally responsible for polluting activities of 
corporations within their borders.
 
It means that States have a duty of care 
with respect to neighboring States, or, in other words, an obligation of 
―due diligence‖ to prevent transboundary harm. State responsibility will 
usually be based on breach of an obligation of due diligence in the 
regulation and control of such potentially harmful activities.
312
 
(2) The principle does not impose an absolute duty to prevent all 
harm, but rather requires each state to prohibit those activities 
known to cause significant harm to the environment, such as the 
dumping of toxic waste into an international lake, and to mitigate 
harm from lawful activities that may harm the environment, by 
imposing limits, for example, on the discharges of pollutants into 
the atmosphere or shared watercourses.
313
 
The standard of care required by the due diligence obligation depends on 
the social and economic development level of the source country. At a 
minimum, however, the International Law Commission says it is an 
obligation of ―good governance‖ that requires that the source State 
―should possess a legal system and sufficient resources to maintain an 
adequate administrative apparatus to control and monitor the activities.‖314  
 
 
 310. Rio Declaration, supra note 137, princ. 2.  
 311. See, e.g., The Environmental Law Programme of the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in cooperation with The International Council of 
Environmental Law, Draft International Covenant on the Environment and Development, art. 13 
(2004), available at http://www.i-c-e-l.org/english/EPLP31EN_rev2.pdf; Convention on Biological 
Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 3, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, pmbl., May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, July 9, 1985, art. 20, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1490.htm; UNCLOS, 
supra note 260, art. 194 ¶ (2); LRTAP Convention, supra note 14. 
 312. HUNTER, supra note 140, at 475–76. 
 313. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 91 
(2007).  
 314. Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 136, commentary to art. 
3, ¶ 17. 
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2. The Precautionary Principle 
While not enjoying the same status as a rule in international law as the 
duty to prevent transboundary harm, the precautionary principle has been 
widely adopted in environmental practice in Europe
315
 and many 
multilateral environmental treaties.
316
 The essence of the precautionary 
principle is ―[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.‖317 The 
precautionary principle has been incorporated into environmental 
regulation with varying strengths. The weakest version merely rebuts the 
presumption that action is unwarranted until it is proven that a risk is real; 
the strongest version would reverse the burden of proof on the person 
undertaking an activity to show that the activity was safe.
318
 
3. Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development ―meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.‖319 Many would dispute that sustainable development is a legal 
norm; sustainable development in many ways resembles an economic 
paradigm in which normative goals are embedded. Notwithstanding, 
sustainable development has been recognized as a concept expressing ―the 
need to reconcile environmental protection and economic development‖ 
by the International Court of Justice
320
 and in various forms by national 
judiciaries.
321
 
The sustainable development concept is often interpreted to include 
two underlying principles: intergenerational equity and intra-generational 
 
 
 315. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 17, 
amended by Treaty on European Union, Title XVI, art. 130r, Feb. 7, 1992, 1759 U.N.T.S. 3, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html. 
 316.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3.3, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107, 165; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38 (1992); Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, supra note 
264, art. 10; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 255; The Basel 
Convention, supra note 246. 
 317. Rio Declaration, supra note 137, princ. 15. 
 318. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 22, at 1509. 
 319. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (WCED), OUR COMMON 
FUTURE 43 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987). 
 320. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 135, ¶ 140. 
 321. See Brian Preston, The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Sustainable Development: The 
Experience of Asia and the Pacific, 9 ASIA PAC. J. OF ENVTL. L. 109 (2008). 
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equity.
 
It is generally understood that sustainable development is more 
than an environmental mandate and rests on three pillars: environmental 
protection, economic development and social development.
322
 Thus, 
sustainable development compels States to try to simultaneously eliminate 
poverty. In this regard, any treaty should hope to promote, or at least not 
prejudice, energy access for the poor.  
4. Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (“CBDR”) 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration states: 
In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. 
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view 
of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and 
of the technologies and financial resources they command.
323
 
This version of CBDR implies that when defining preventative 
obligations, both the different capacities of States and their different 
contributions to the problems need to be taken into account.
324
 Although 
CBDR is not customary international law and is still controversial with 
some developed countries like the United States, it has helped facilitate 
consensus for many universal treaties, such as the Climate Change 
Convention (Article 3), the Montreal Protocol (Article 4) and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Preamble).
325
 
Differences in economic development levels of the members of the 
region should not be a bar to a regional treaty. Under principles such as 
CBDR and Rio Principle 2, the structure of modern MEA soften take into 
account the different interests of developed and developing countries.
326
 
Among the treaty techniques for taking into account the differing needs to 
develop are grandfathering clauses, delayed time frames for compliance 
and various funds to subsidize technology transfer.
327
 These devices are 
 
 
 322. Id. at 637. 
 323. Rio Declaration, supra note 137, princ. 7. 
 324. HUNTER, supra note 140, at 464, 340. 
 325. See supra note 316. 
 326. See supra note 171. 
 327. The differential treatment of developing countries under the UNFCCC is manifested in 
different mitigation requirements in Articles 4.1 and 4.2; Technology Transfer in Article 4.1; 
Assistance in Meeting Costs of Adverse Impacts in Article 4.4; and Financial Commitments in Article 
4.3-5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 
165; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38 (1992); U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II). 
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useful to treaty negotiators for ensuring a long-term stable solution by 
meeting the needs of both developing and developed country parties. 
5. The Polluter Pays Principle 
The polluter pays principle directs environmental authorities to design 
regulation with the goal of internalizing negative pollution externalities to 
reduce the social costs of pollution.
328
 
One version states, ―National authorities should endeavour to promote 
the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic 
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 
principle, bear the cost of pollution with due regard to the public interest 
and without distorting international trade and investment.‖329 
Originating within the OECD,
330
 the polluter pays principle is generally 
held as a normative principle of environmental law in the European Union; 
however, the widening acceptance of the practice of emissions trading is 
one indication of the growing popularity of the logic of the principle.
331
 
Within Northeast Asia, the polluter pays principle seems to be accepted by 
Japan and South Korea, and China also seems to accept the principle with 
respect to regulating many internal sources of domestic pollution.
332
 
B. Transparency, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice 
Public participation in environmental decision-making and access to 
justice at the national level were the central concerns of Principle 10 of the 
Rio Declaration: 
 
 
 328. HUNTER, supra note 140, at 484. 
 329. Rio Declaration, supra note 137, princ. 16. 
 330. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RECOMMENDATION OF 
THE COUNCIL ON GUIDING PRINCIPLES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, ANNEX, 1A (1972), available at http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/ 
Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=4&InstrumentPID=255&Lang=en&Book=False; 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE (1974), available at http://webnet 
.oecd.org/oecdacts/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=11&InstrumentPID=9&Lan
g=en&Book=False. 
 331. State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012, THE WORLD BANK (2012), http://web 
.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,co
ntentMDK:23206428~menuPK:5575595~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853
~isCURL:Y,00.html. 
 332. Michicazu Kochima, Promoting 3Rs in Developing Countries: Lessons from the Japanese 
Experience, IDE-JETRO (2008), http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Spot/30.html. 
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(e) Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of 
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, 
each individual shall have appropriate access to information 
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness 
and participation by making information widely available. Effective 
access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress 
and remedy, shall be provided.
333
 
In matters of significant transboundary harm between States, the ILC also 
provides for disclosure to the public by the state, stating that a state ―shall, 
by such means as are appropriate, provide the public likely to be affected 
by an activity within the scope of the present articles with relevant 
information relating to that activity, the risk involved and the harm which 
might result and ascertain their views.‖334 
In international environmental policy-making, public participation has 
risen dramatically in the last decade as NGOs have been allowed to obtain 
observer status under various treaties.
335
 At the domestic level, the 
emphasis has been on the right to take part in decision-making and 
enforcement through administrative procedures and judicial redress; in 
contrast, at the international level, the main purpose has been promoting 
increased public awareness and understanding of environmental issues.
336
 
While NGOs have certainly had a massive impact in the international law 
debates, they do not participate directly in the decision-making for treaties.  
Recently, however, a rights-based approach has emerged in the 
international law-making arena that advocates citizen participation in 
decision-making and enforcement of environmental law through 
administrative procedures and judicial redress at all levels.
337
 Even though 
it is still quite controversial, there have been ―some signs that the norms 
and procedures applicable to participation in, respectively, the 
 
 
 333. Rio Declaration, supra note 137. 
 334. Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 136, art. 13. 
 335. UN Releases List of Organizations Applying for Observer Status, UNFCCC NEWS REPORT, 
(2010), available at http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/unfccc-releases-list-of-organizations-applying-for-
observer-status. 
 336. Jonas Ebbeson, Public Participation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 22, at 689–702. 
 337. Id. at 684. 
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international and national, context of decision-making are being 
integrated.‖338 
The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (―Aarhus Convention‖)339 has gone the farthest in this regard by 
not only obligating States to guarantee such rights to their citizens, but by 
also providing substantial privileges in the procedures of the treaty‘s 
compliance committee to private parties.
340
 NGOs are represented on the 
Compliance Committee and the public may initiate non-compliance 
procedures against State parties, although they do not participate in 
decision making.
341
 
C. Three Foci for Cooperation: Co-benefits, Sustainable Energy 
Investment and Green Growth 
Finally, we would like to suggest some additional concepts that could 
guide negotiators in setting the form of the treaty. First, wherever possible, 
the agreement should leverage co-benefits. Co-benefits exist when 
objectives of more than one policy can be satisfied with a single measure. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change advising the UNFCCC 
has pointed out that substantial co-benefits exist when attempting to 
control conventional air pollution and reduce GHG emissions.
342
 Any 
regional agreement should take optimal advantage of the cost savings from 
this scientific fact by using integrated assessment modeling to set 
reduction targets. 
Secondly, a transboundary air pollution treaty should concentrate on 
early adoption of clean energy investment in Asia rather than end-of-the-
pipe control. A treaty best promotes sustainable development by using 
alternative energy investment as a means of preventing long term pollution 
 
 
 338. Id.  
 339. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447. 
 340. Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18 COLO. J. INT‘L ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 1 (2007). 
 341. Id. 
 342. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change, 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change § 11.81 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); see also Kirk Smith & Evan Haigler, Co-
benefits of Climate Mitigation and Health Protection in Energy Systems: Scoping Methods, ANN. REV. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 11, 21 (2008) (―Projects to improve efficiency and/or reduce GHG emissions from 
energy systems have the strongest co-benefits potential, i.e., ability to mitigate climate change and 
protect health.‖). 
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alongside the adoption of emissions reduction technology in current 
energy production. Alternative energy should be interpreted to embrace 
many sectors, including fuel cells and bio-energy for transportation. This 
will help avoid the entrenchment of polluting technologies that occurs due 
to the dependence of modern economic development on carbon energy 
infrastructure. Ideally, the treaty should positively incorporate incentives 
for clean energy investment in China similar to the Clean Development 
Mechanism (―CDM‖) under the Kyoto Protocol. Both Korea and Japan 
have significant experience in CDM projects in China already, where a 
well-laid implementing infrastructure exists.
343
 
Finally, any agreement should be consistent with the ideal of green 
growth, namely the creation of economic value through environmentally 
protective actions. For example, the treaty could enhance intra-country 
investment and trade in emission reduction technologies and processes and 
renewable energy by incorporating a commitment to lower barriers to 
trade and investment in these technologies. Market mechanisms such as 
regional emissions trading for sulfur dioxide or mutual recognition of 
renewable energy credits could also be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Among the many relevant lessons the Trail Smelter has for 
environmental governance in Northeast Asia, the first and foremost point 
is that it used the law to confront the transboundary air pollution problem. 
However rudimentary the arbitration procedure, the United States and 
Canada publicly acknowledged the reality of the harm and the need to take 
action and prevent harm to future generations. In doing so, the countries 
recognized that the law is the proper tool to realize society‘s goals for 
justice and protect the innocent victims of pollution. This is especially true 
in the case of widely felt public harms based on the consumption of 
international public goods.  
Active prevention through regional commitments not limited to 
monitoring or technical aid is incumbent on the States of the region to 
fulfill their obligations under international environmental law to prevent 
transboundary harm. Whether through the legalization of an existing 
 
 
 343.  See Craig Hart, Kenji Watanabe, Ka Joon Song & Xiaolin Li, East Asia Clean Development 
Mechanism: Engaging East Asian Countries in Sustainable Development and Climate Regulation 
through CDM, 20 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L. REV. 645, 663–65, 669, 676 (2008) (discussing Chinese 
policies and regulations and projects by Japanese and Korean investors in China). 
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regional cooperative mechanism or the creation of a new institution, 
Korea, Japan and China should move beyond diplomatic and scientific 
fora and engage in substantive, precise legal commitments for the 
prevention of transboundary air pollution. Because of its immense 
historical influence, we have used the Trail Smelter case to introduce some 
successful regional environmental governance institutions on 
transboundary air pollution that share the characteristics of legalization. 
Without attempting to prescribe a particular organizational outcome, we 
have proposed a normative platform for the negotiation of a new 
agreement that may address the critical nexus between energy, air 
pollution and global warming.  
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